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73 
ANTIPODAL INVECTIVE: A FIELD GUIDE TO 
KANGAROOS IN AMERICAN COURTROOMS 
Parker B. Potter, Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Antipodes are “[a]ny two places or regions that are on diametrically 
opposite sides of the earth.”1  Go to the opposite side of the earth from 
where I sat while drafting this article and you will find, among other 
things, Australia.  Go to Australia, and you will find kangaroos, by the 
thousands.  Go to Westlaw, and you will find kangaroo courts, by the 
hundreds.2 
I ran a Westlaw search on the phrase “kangaroo court” after I 
discovered, while researching another article,3 that Justice Bernard 
Levinson of the Hawai’i Supreme Court once described the process by 
which a hospital had revoked a physician’s staff privileges as a 
“kafkaesque ‘kangaroo court.’”4  After attempting, without success, to 
imagine a connection between the celebrated Czech author and the 
iconic Australian marsupial,5 I decided on a whim to see how many 
other judges had used the phrase “kangaroo court” in an opinion.  
Expecting a couple of dozen, I went slackjawed when my whimsical 
Westlaw search boomeranged back with more than 375 state and federal 
judicial opinions stressing the seams of its sadly distended pouch.6 
 
* Adjunct Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire and law clerk, U.S. 
District Court.  
 1. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 62 (4th coll. ed. 2002). 
 2. See, e.g., Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); Silver v. Castle 
Mem’l Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 575 (Haw. 1972) (Levinson, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Hill, 
632 A.2d 928, 928 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 3. Parker B. Potter, Jr., Ordeal by Trial: Judicial References to the Nightmare World of 
Franz Kafka, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 195 (2005). 
 4. Silver, 497 P.2d at 575. 
 5. Kafka’s hometown, Prague, is not that far from Austria, and Austria sounds a lot like 
Australia, but that can’t be it. 
 6. See, e.g., Kearney, 316 F.3d at 23; Silver, 497 P.2d at 575; Hill, 632 A.2d at 928.  My 
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Of those hundreds of opinions, several dozen arose out of the 
operation of courts “assembled by various groups, such as prisoners in a 
jail (to settle disputes between inmates) and players on a baseball team 
(to ‘punish’ teammates who commit fielding errors).”7  Those “real” 
kangaroo courts are the subject of another article.8  Several dozen more 
opinions recounted instances in which a litigant or an attorney directly 
accused a judge of conducting a kangaroo court.  While they are 
extremely colorful, those opinions are also the subject of another article.9  
This article discusses three other groups of opinions that use the phrase 
“kangaroo court.” 
The first section describes the various decision-making behaviors 
that qualify a tribunal to wear the Scarlet K.  It does so by discussing 
opinions in which a judge or a litigant has given a definition of the term 
“kangaroo court” when that term is used metaphorically, as invective, to 
disparage the fairness of another tribunal.  The second section describes 
the habitat of adjudicatory kangaroos by examining opinions like Silver 
v. Castle Memorial Hospital, in which a judge has called another 
tribunal a kangaroo court.10  The third section is devoted to unverified 
sightings, as reported in opinions in which a judge has disagreed with a 
litigant who has accused another tribunal of kangaroo-ism.11 
Finally, by way of concluding my introduction, I should disclose 
that I am hardly the first to characterize the phrase “kangaroo court” as 
invective.12  For example, in Commonwealth v. Hill, Judge Olszewski of 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted: 
[Jeffrey] Hill’s handwritten appellate brief, however, contains little 
 
surprise was two-fold.  First, in nearly seven years as a judicial law clerk, no judge has ever asked 
me to slip the phrase “kangaroo court” into an opinion I was drafting, and I would never think of 
handing a judge a draft in which I had inserted that phrase on my own.  Second, as a legal writing 
instructor, I always counsel my students against colorful writing.  Write like a judge, I tell them, and 
you stand a better chance of convincing a judge of the judiciousness of your position.  Based upon 
the gold mine of kangaroo court references I found, I may have to modify my advice to students.  Or 
not. 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (7th ed. 2000). 
 8. Parker B. Potter, Jr., The Good, the Bad, the Ugly, and More: A Survey of Litigation 
Arising from the Operation of Kangaroo Courts, 1 INT’L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT’G 121 (2005).  
 9. Parker B. Potter, Jr., Dropping the K-Bomb: A Compendium of Kangaroo Tales from 
American Judicial Opinions 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. (forthcoming 2006). 
 10. Silver v. Castle Mem’l Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 575 (Haw. 1972). 
 11. The word “kangaroo-ism” appears in no dictionary with which I am familiar.  I use the 
term simply as a shorthand synonym for “those qualities that would cause a judge to call some other 
tribunal a kangaroo court.” 
 12. See, e.g., Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (“While Kearney 
intimates that it [his suspension hearing] was a kangaroo court, he fails to support his invective with 
an evidentiary predicate.”). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss1/4
POTTER1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:16:14 AM 
2006] KANGAROO COURTS 75 
substantive argument; it is mostly pure invective.  Hill rants over “the 
crooked Lycoming County kangaroo court,” where 
“PATHOLOGICAL LIAR OSOKOW, THE PERJURER” (referring to 
District Attorney Kenneth Osokow) and “SENILE BIGOTTED, 
INCOMPETENT, CORRUPT GATES. . .” (referring to Judge Gates) 
“railroaded”. . . him with “deliberate and malicious perjuries.”  See 
appellant’s brief, section mysteriously titled “Judicial Notice” 
(capitalization in the original).  This Court fares little better; Hill 
addresses the Superior Court as “SANCTIMONIOUS, SELF-
RIGHTEOUS CROOKS” and assures us that we are “ALL A BUNCH 
OF PERJURERS & CRIMINAL, ARROGANT, POMPOUS, 
HYPOCRITICAL, SANCTIMONIOUS BASTARDS.” 
Hill is evidently a tad upset over his encounter with the judicial 
process. We might be willing to take Hill’s anger and invective in 
stride, if only he would address some legal issues in his brief.  
Unfortunately, in venting his spleen, Hill has covered his substantive 
arguments with bile . . . . [W]e cannot distill enough lucid discourse 
out of Hill’s raging tirade to understand his allegations of error. 
Hill’s brief sets a new standard for scandalous and impertinent 
material. Setting aside the insults and abuse, Hill’s brief is still so 
defective as to preclude any kind of appellate review. . . . We cannot 
search a record which is not before us for possible abuses of discretion; 
it is incumbent upon Hill to bring these matters to our attention, 
explain them and document them.  Even with the most generous 
allowances for pro se drafting, we should not hesitate to simply quash 
his appeal.13 
 
Other judges have characterized the term “kangaroo court” as 
“inflammatory language”14 and “unnecessarily provocative.”15  In Cheek 
 
 13. Commonwealth v. Hill, 632 A.2d 928, 928-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  Jeffrey Hill, it turns 
out, has earned quite a reputation as a source of invective, antipodal and otherwise: 
We also cannot help but note that Hill has filed numerous suits against not only his court 
appointed counsel, but district attorneys, judges and other county officials . . . The 
essence of Hill’s present appeal seems to be that “[t]he prothonotary, the sheriff, and the 
judge along with the defendant who is an officer in their court don’t want me feeding the 
crooked Lycoming County kangaroo court anymore crow, so they conspired to stop me 
and are currently involved in shirking responsibility for their dirty, devious political 
chicanery and skullduggery.” At least Hill is a colorful writer. 
Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 186, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of 
Hill’s complaint alleging legal malpractice) (citations omitted). 
 14. Fureigh v. Haney (In re Haney), 238 B.R. 427, 430 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999) 
(observing that the debtor’s motion “describ[ed] the Court as arrogant and feigning the powers of a 
3
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v. Commissioner,16 Judge Parker noted that “[t]he transcript of the trial 
generally consists of petitioner’s frivolous, protester-type arguments and 
petitioner’s unbridled harangue against this Court as ‘biased and 
prejudiced,’ ‘a fraud,’ ‘a kangaroo court,’ and ‘this star chamber 
Sixteenth Century court.’”17 
Despite the rather odd mental image that appears when kangaroo 
courts and the Star Chamber are mentioned in close proximity, Cheek is 
not the only opinion to report (or utilize) that exotic juxtaposition.18  The 
most comprehensive statement about the similarities between kangaroo 
courts and the Star Chamber comes from Justice Adir’s dissent in State 
ex rel. Burns v. City of Livingston,19 in which the majority affirmed the 
trial court’s decision not to overturn the Livingston City Council’s 
discharge of Herbert Burns as the City’s fire chief: 
The “Minutes of Adjourned Meeting of City Council held Aug. 13, 
1962” fail to show what, if any, charges had been lodged against Fire 
Chief Burns when he was called on the carpet before the City Council 
on the night of August 13, 1962, and where he witnessed the adoption 
of the recommendation and motion of the three aldermen constituting 
the Fire and Police Committee that he, the Fire Chief, “be demoted 
from the position of Fire Chief to Fireman.”   
Such hearings as were accorded the relator Herbert P. Burns, on 
August 13, 1962, and on January 10, 1963, could have been patterned 
after the Court of Star Chamber of England which was abolished by 
the Long Parliament in the year 1641, or they could have been 
patterned after the Spanish Inquisition which was abolished in France 
in 1772, and, at long last, in Spain in the year 1834, or such hearings 
could have been patterned after the “kangaroo courts” held by inmates 
 
‘kangaroo court’”). 
 15. Harris v. Bd. of Registration in Chiropody (Podiatry), 179 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Mass. 1962) 
(stating that the petitioner’s attorney characterized certain “hearings as ‘two steps below the 
kangaroo court’”). 
 16. Cheek v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 111 (1987). 
 17. Id. at 111 n.2. 
 18. See, e.g., People v. Tuler, 630 N.E.2d 1287, 1288 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “[o]n 
appeal, the petitioner claims that he was denied due process of law at the post-conviction petition 
hearing.  In so doing, the petitioner characterizes the proceedings below as ‘Kangaroo Court’ 
proceedings which resembled something from the Court of Star Chamber”); McCraw v. Adcox, 399 
S.W.2d 753, 754 (Tenn. 1966) (reporting defendant/appellant’s characterization of the trial court as 
a “hatchet court,” his protest of “the crookedness of Judge James F. Morgan,” and his awareness 
that judge and attorney were “plan[ning] a star chamber court proceeding or kangaroo trial for the 
alleged writ of replevin”). 
 19. State ex rel. Burns v. City of Livingston, 395 P.2d 971, 996 (Mont. 1964). 
4
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of various jails in this country.20 
 In short, my research has revealed no instance in which a litigant or 
judge has ever turned to the kangaroo to help him or her say something 
nice about a decision-making individual or institution. 
II.  CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIORS OF THE MARSUPIAL DECISION-MAKER 
In this section, I begin with judicial discussions of the qualities that 
qualify a tribunal for designation as a kangaroo court.  Then I turn to 
definitions offered by litigants.  I conclude with a brief look at other 
legal nouns that have been modified by the adjective “kangaroo.”  In 
other words, this section provides a comprehensive working definition of 
the term “kangaroo-ism” as well as a catalogue of the characteristic 
behaviors of the marsupial decision-maker.21 
As a preliminary matter, and notwithstanding one opinion in which 
a prison official presiding over a disciplinary proceeding allegedly 
proclaimed himself to be “Captain Kangaroo,”22 there can be little doubt 
that kangaroo-ism in the courtroom – or any other decision-making 
forum – is generally regarded as injudicious behavior.  In a dissenting 
opinion in Pierson v. Ray,23 in which Justice William O. Douglas argued 
that not “all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous 
their conduct are immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983,”24 Justice Douglas asked, rhetorically: “What about the judge who 
 
 20. Id. at 996 (citation omitted).  See also Potter, supra note 3, at 287-88 (discussing judicial 
opinions that refer to both Franz Kafka and the Star Chamber). 
 21. Sadly, however, while my study of judicial references to kangaroo courts has yielded a 
treasure trove of interesting information – enough for three different articles – there is one kangaroo 
court question for which the caselaw does not provide a satisfactory answer:  Among the hundreds 
of opinions I read while researching kangaroo court references, not a single one explained why 
sham legal proceedings are conducted in kangaroo courts as opposed to, say, platypus courts, weasel 
courts, or dung beetle courts.  The best I can offer is the following observation: 
The fact is, or seems to be, that the term “kangaroo court” is not disparaging of the 
Australian judicial process.  Rather, it appears that the term arose in the American West 
in the 1850’s to refer to informal tribunals that dispensed instant “justice.”  The 
marsupial analogy may have been a sardonic comparison between the hopping gait of a 
kangaroo and the ad hoc and unpredictable leaps of logic and procedures of the 
American frontier tribunals. 
Marvin J. Garbis, Aussie Inspired Musings on Technological Issues – Of Kangaroo Courts, 
Tutorials & Hot Tub Cross-Examination, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 142 n.8 (2003).  While the 
foregoing passage comes from an article in The Green Bag rather than a judicial opinion, its author 
is an Article III judge, id. at 141 n.1, which lends a comforting degree of authority to his musing. 
 22. Higgason v. Hanks, 134 F.3d 374 (unpublished table decision), Nos. 97-1687 & 97-1688, 
1998 WL 4741, at * 3 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 1998). 
 23. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 24. Id. at 558-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
5
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conspires with local law enforcement officers to ‘railroad’ a dissenter?  
What about the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a kangaroo court?  
Or one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain a 
conviction?”25 
During a colloquy with two disruptive jurors in a homicide trial, the 
presiding trial judge in Shelton v. State26 noted: “No[,] it is no longer 
possible, and should never be possible to have kangaroo courts.”27  In a 
dissenting opinion in Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,28 Justice Hill opined: 
“In my view, this unpopular petitioner is being abused by the system like 
a speed trap victim in a kangaroo court.”29  In similarly colorful 
language, Judge Karlton of the Eastern District of California once 
explained that “denying applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
a particular hearing does not reduce that hearing to a ‘barroom brawl nor 
a Kangaroo Court.’”30  And in Jacobs v. Commonwealth,31 Judge 
Schroder dissented from a majority opinion in which his colleagues 
affirmed the appointment of a special judge because the defendant had 
not made a timely objection.32  Judge Schroder argued that “[w]ithout 
authority from our constitution, statutes, or rules adopted pursuant 
thereto, the appointment has no legal basis”33 and went on to opine that 
 
 25. Id. at 566-67.  In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the United States Supreme 
Court was faced with a civil rights action brought by a witness who had refused to testify before 
California’s Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities.  While the majority ruled 
in favor of the defendants, on grounds of legislative privilege, Justice Douglas dissented, arguing 
that some abuses of legislative committees may be so egregious as to require policing by the judicial 
branch.  Id. at 381-82.  He explained: 
It is speech and debate in the legislative department which our constitutional scheme 
makes privileged.  Included, of course, are the actions of legislative committees that are 
authorized to conduct hearings or make investigations so as to lay the foundation for 
legislative action. . . . May they depart with impunity from their legislative functions, sit 
as kangaroo courts, and try men for their loyalty and their political beliefs? May they 
substitute trial before committees for trial before juries?  May they sit as a board of 
censors over industry, prepare their blacklists of citizens, and issue pronouncements as 
devastating as any bill of attainder? 
No other public official has complete immunity for his actions. . . . Yet now we hold that 
no matter the extremes to which a legislative committee may go it is not answerable to 
an injured party under the civil rights legislation. 
Id. at 382-83. 
 26. Shelton v. State, 183 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Wis. 1971). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 247 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 1978). 
 29. Id. at 765. 
 30. United States v. Smith, 87 F.R.D. 693, 700 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (quoting United States v. 
Salsedo, 477 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1979)). 
 31. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997). 
 32. Id. at 420. 
 33. Id. 
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“[g]ood intentions and competence in the person appointed special judge 
will not substitute for legal authority any more than recognizing a 
kangaroo court of the ‘Freeman’ who attempts to set up a parallel 
government by ignoring the constitution and the ballot box.”34  Most 
simply, the Nebraska Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he terms 
‘Kangaroo Court’ and ‘Kangaroo Judge’ are terms of contempt and utter 
disrespect, and their use tends to bring discredit on the judiciary.”35 
The insult value of the phrase “kangaroo court” is so well 
understood that several criminal defense attorneys have argued, usually 
to no avail, that their clients were incompetent to stand trial based, in 
part, on their clients having accused the presiding judge of running a 
kangaroo court.36  Another enterprising defense attorney once argued, 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Rhodes, 131 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Neb. 1964). 
 36. For example, in State v. Perkins, 811 P.2d 1142 (Kan. 1991), a defendant on trial for 
robbery, rape, and murder claimed to have a split personality and that the crimes were committed by 
an alter-ego.  Id. at 1146.   At trial, Perkins suddenly made the following outburst:  
THE COURT:  State’s Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 will be admitted at this time. You 
may publish those to the jury. 
MR. PERKINS: . . . blow my goddamn brains out.  Don’t stand a fuckin’ 
chance, man.  I didn’t choke that damn woman.  I didn’t rape that damn 
woman.  I don’t care what the hell you do with me, just give me a fuckin’ 
gun, I’ll blow my fuckin’ head off.  You guys got the wrong man. Judge, you 
denied everything I had.  You denied my constitutional right for a new 
counselor.  For no reason.  You violated my right.  I’ve got the rights as 
anybody else.  I’m just a hitchhiker.  I didn’t kill that woman.  I seen the 
person that did it.  But you people don’t want to fuckin’ believe me.  I am 
what I am.  I’m a blooming’ hitchhiker.  That DA man had a pleasure.  He 
knows he’s got an easy verdict, to find me guilty.  People, I don’t really care.  
My ass is six feet under I go back to that jail, I guarantee it.  I tried it once, I 
tried it twice.  This ain’t right.  This is not right.  I passed into this town and 
this was what I get.  A Kangaroo court.  You’re worse than Louisiana.  Send 
me back to jail, man.  Send me back to jail. You violated my rights, man.  I 
don’t care no more. . . . 
After this, in chambers, the defense moved for a mistrial.  Then, after the 
lunch break, the defendant refused to come to the courtroom and was crying 
and shaking.  An in-chambers conference was held.  The trial court expressed 
the opinion that Perkins was acting.  The trial court then warned Perkins that 
he had to behave in court and Perkins asked to be taken back to jail in Colby 
and to let the trial proceed without him.  This was done and the trial 
proceeded in his absence.  The next morning, the defense, in an in-chambers 
conference, again moved for a mistrial and also moved for another 
competency evaluation.  The trial court denied both motions, finding that 
Perkins was putting on an act. 
The final part of the Larned State Hospital report (prepared in advance of 
trial) provides: “It was noted that should Mr. Perkins become behaviorally or 
communicatively disruptive or uncooperative either with his attorney or 
during criminal trial proceedings, it would be volitional in nature and not the 
result of a major mental illness.” 
Based on the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
not ordering another competency hearing or in granting a mistrial. 
7
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Id. at 1148-49.   
  In State v. Marshall, 472 N.E.2d 1139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s decision not to order additional inquiry into the defendant’s competency to stand 
trial despite: 
various outbursts including an accusation that the trial judge and prosecuting attorney 
were selling drugs; repeated references to the trial as a “kangaroo court”; reference to 
trial counsel as “this little gay-guy sitting here”; and defendant’s statement on the stand 
that he had been raped by the sheriffs and corrections officers while in jail. 
Id. at 1142.  See also State v. Arnold, No. 03C01-9902-CR-00081, 2000 WL 14691, at *3 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2000) (noting that “[i]n his pro se motions, the defendant refers once to [his] 
trial as a ‘kangaroo trial’ and makes accusations of inaction and malpractice against his attorneys,” 
but rejecting defendant’s claim “that the record contains ‘multiple, voluminous [,] virtually 
irrational, accusatory and vituperative comments by the [defendant], which were available to the 
trial court’ and which should have raised a doubt about the defendant’s competency,” explaining 
that its “review of [the defendant’s] motions reveals nothing that rises to a level of caustic and 
illogical accusation that would indicate incompetence to the trial court”). 
  In another case from Ohio, State v. Cowans, 717 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1999), the court ruled 
that a criminal defendant, during the penalty phase of his trial for murder, and who “[i]n 
disrespectful and sometimes foul language . . . protested that he regarded the court as a ‘kangaroo 
court’ and did not want to be in the courthouse at all,” id. at 312, did not behave in a way that 
“inherently raise[d] questions concerning his capacity to understand the difference between life and 
death, to fully comprehend the ramifications of his decision, or to reason logically;” id. at 313, and, 
thus, affirmed the trial judge’s finding that “[w]hile disruptive, the Defendant evidenced no mental 
instability but rather acted out his pique,” id. at 312.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Moyer 
provided a detailed description of the defendant’s behavior at trial. Id. at 317-18. 
  A result similar to that in Cowans was reached in Sweezy v. Garrison, 554 F. Supp. 481 
(W.D.N.C. 1982), a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a trial in which the defendant told the 
court, “Man, I don’t like no Kangaroo Court,” id. at 485, and “[t]his is a Kangaroo Court,” id., and 
was excluded from the courtroom on several occasions. 
A review of the foregoing excerpts from the trial transcript reveals that petitioner stated 
he felt he was being railroaded, which is probably a frequent feeling of persons charged 
with crime.  In light of this feeling, it is not surprising that he was abrasive and brusque 
to the judge, as shown by the episodes of refusal to speak to the court; a request that his 
attorneys be replaced; a request for black lawyers; an assertion that the prosecutrix was 
lying; a reference to the judge as a hypocrite; snubs by turning his back to the judge on 
two occasions; references to the proceeding as a “Kangaroo Court;” a refusal to stand; a 
sullenness when asked if he desired to testify; a refusal to be cross-examined; and 
cursing during the rendition of the verdict. . . .  The same conclusion that petitioner was 
essentially an aggressive, hostile person rather than an incompetent one is shown by the 
generally rude, sometimes demanding, sometimes condescending, and sometimes 
sarcastic tenor of his remarks toward counsel, the court, and the witnesses.  The 
following serve to illustrate this point: “Take them two women off, just take them two 
women off . . . .;”  “It don’t make any difference what I said . . . I whispered when I 
come in;”  “I know my constitutional rights, my right to speak for myself;” “Don’t put 
that man on the stand;” “You can call him off the stand now;” “How can she say – that 
women lying;”  “What are you trying to do, boy?  I don’t go for that damn shit;” “I 
didn’t tell him nothing;” “I don’t think I have to testify on my own behalf, the facts 
speak for itself;” “I don’t have to answer that.”  In light of the above perspective on the 
events of which petitioner complains, it simply does not appear that incompetence was a 
problem from which petitioner suffered at trial.  
Id. at 491-92.  Finally, on at least two occasions, judges have mentioned litigant accusations of 
kangaroo-ism in opinions dissenting from decisions such as the ones discussed above.  See, e.g., 
8
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without success, that “the trial court improperly sentenced [his client] 
based upon passion resulting from [his client’s] statements contained in 
a presentence investigation report.”37 His client had claimed, in a  
statement quoted by the trial judge just prior to pronouncing sentence, 
that “the only reason he had been convicted . . . was because Crawford 
County was a ‘kangaroo court’ and the judge had mishandled the 
courtroom.”38  Kangaroo courts are apparently so beyond the pale that 
while the defendant deputy sheriff in Colson v. Lloyd’s of London39 was 
able to insure himself against “loss by reason of liability imposed by 
law . . . by reason of any false arrest, assault and battery (as herein 
defined), false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,”40 his policy 
explicitly “exclude[d] . . . claims for libel or slander or the existence of a 
‘kangaroo court’ or claims for invasion of property rights.”41 
In United States v. Gilley,42 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces held that David Gilley “was denied effective assistance of 
counsel during the post-trial phase of his court martial”43 in part because 
his counsel submitted to the court a letter from Gilley’s father, 
characterized by the court as a “vitriolic attack on the Air Force and its 
judicial system.”44  Among other things, Gilley’s father said of the court 
martial that “[t]he whole dammed thing was a kangaroo court.”45  If a 
 
United States ex rel. Phelan v. Brierley, 453 F.2d 73, 95 (3d Cir. 1971) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), 
vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Dunn v. Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Ky. 1978) 
(Lukowsky, J., dissenting). 
 37. State v. Rittenhour, 678 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Colson v. Lloyd’s of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). 
 40. Id. at 43-44. 
 41. Id. at 44. 
 42. United States v. Gilley, 56 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 
 43. Id. at 125. 
 44. Id. at 119. 
 45. Id.  The accusation of kangaroo-ism was, however, one of the milder parts of the letter.  
The elder Gilley characterized his son’s wife as “a lying tramp whore who wouldn’t know a decent 
person if they kicked her in the ass and give [sic] her a new set of brains, which she doesn’t have.”  
Id.  And he told the members of the court-martial,  
I hope you low-lifed [sic] bastards along with that lying no good whore and her bastard 
kids, that lied about David, enjoy your freedom now, and burn in hell later. . . . I think 
when the military or the government does something like this their [sic] nothing but a 
chicken-shit bunch that should have to face the firing squad because they don’t know 
what justice is.  Those dumb ass Air Force judges, lawyers, and jurors all thrown together 
wouldn’t make one good civilian lawyer.  In civilian life they laugh at the dumb asses.  I 
wish I was a rich man, I’d shove all this up their ass. 
Id.  While it is impossible to say with certainty, it seems likely that if Gilley’s father had limited 
himself to the kangaroo court comment, his son’s attorney would not have been found ineffective 
for submitting the letter to the court. 
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lawyer is considered ineffective for giving a judge a document including 
his client’s father’s accusation of kangaroo-ism, then kangaroo-ism must 
necessarily be a bad thing, or at least a thing most judges would prefer 
not to be accused of.  Some judges even object to allowing accusations 
of kangaroo-ism to remain part of the public record.  In Skolnick v. 
Hallett,46 “[p]laintiff’s complaint charge[d] that defendants [including 
Judge Hallett] conducted a ‘kangaroo court’ with him as a victim.”47  
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted,48 and also “found and held the complaint 
was replete with scurrilous, offensive and objectionable allegations 
principally leveled at Judge Hallett, and should not be permitted to 
remain of record.”49  The court of appeals affirmed.50 
In sum, there can be little doubt that kangaroo-ism, in all its various 
forms, is a universally disfavored paradigm for decision-making. 
A.  Judicial Observations 
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, in rejecting a habeas 
petitioner’s expansive reading of Circuit Rule 10, once explained: “We 
do not doubt the value of protecting the innocent.  That is the principal 
reason why we have an elaborate criminal procedure rather than 
kangaroo courts.”51  As it turns out, the term “kangaroo court” has not 
been applied to just one form of adjudicative malfeasance.  In this 
section I explore the various categories of malfunctioning adjudication 
that have earned judicial declarations of kangaroo-ism. 
1.  Coercion 
One particular kind of kangaroo court is that created by the 
coercion of confessions from criminal defendants.  Justice Douglas 
 
 46. Skolnick v. Hallett, 350 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 47. Id. at 861. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  In Newcomer v. Huey, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 202 (Ct. Com. Pl., Fayette County 1959), the 
defendant filed a motion requesting a change of venue in which he “expresse[d] his opinion ‘that 
this Court is of the nature of a Kangaroo Court, having no respect for the Law whatsoever,’ and that 
the court is ‘masterminded’ by a ‘politician’ whose attorney represents the [plaintiffs] and 
concerning whom [defendant] has also made uncomplimentary remarks.”  Id. at 205.  The plaintiffs 
moved “to strike the defendant’s paper writing as impertinent and scandalous.”  Id.  While 
determining that the defendant’s pleading “might well, for the most part, be stricken upon that 
ground,” id., the court, nonetheless, “deem[ed] it better, in order to make clear the unfounded nature 
of [the defendant’s] complaints of unfair treatment, to consider the merits of the application.” Id. 
 50. Skolnick, 350 F.2d at 861. 
 51. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1261 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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explained, in an appeal arising out of a criminal prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 242: 
It is plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would not be 
allowed in evidence whatever the school of thought concerning the 
scope and meaning of the Due Process Clause.  This is the classic use 
of force to make a man testify against himself.  The result is as plain as 
if the rack, the wheel, and the thumb-screw – the ancient methods of 
securing evidence by torture – were used to compel the confession. . . . 
[W]here police take matters into their own hands, seize victims, beat 
and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the 
Constitution.  It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally 
constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.52 
Justice Douglas expanded upon the concept of kangaroo-ism by coercion 
in his concurring opinion in Spano v. New York,53 a case that involved 
the interrogation, without counsel, of a man who was “not . . . a suspect 
but . . . a man who [had] been formally charged with a crime.”54  In the 
words of Justice Douglas: 
This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a judge 
and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by the police.  This is a 
kangaroo court procedure whereby the police produce the vital 
evidence in the form of a confession which is useful or necessary to 
obtain a conviction.  They in effect deny him effective representation 
by counsel.  This seems to me to be a flagrant violation of the principle 
. . . that the right of counsel extends to the preparation for trial, as well 
as to the trial itself.55 
In a similar vein, in a concurring opinion in Brodkowizc v. State,56 in 
which the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a prisoner’s 
motion for post-conviction relief on grounds that the defendant’s guilty 
plea was not coerced, Judge Seiler began by stating: 
I know of no warrant for the jailers to hold kangaroo court and decide 
the punishment for assault and attempted jail break, and I am skeptical 
about a guilty plea taken from a defendant who concededly has been 
 
 52. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1951) (citations omitted).  See also Pool 
v. United States, 260 F.2d 57, 63 (9th Cir. 1958) (quoting Williams and rejecting defendant police 
officer’s argument that his beating of suspects was not actionable because beating did not lead to 
confession). 
 53. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 54. Id. at 324-25. 
 55. Id. at 325 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).  
 56. Brodkowicz v. State, 474 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1971). 
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whipped with a leather belt while forced to spread-eagle himself 
against the wall and kept naked in a “dry cell” over a period of weeks 
in the dead of winter, because such attitude on the part of the jailers 
and treatment at their hands has an element or quality of coercion fixed 
in its very nature.57 
At least in Brodkowicz, the kangaroo court was run by jailers rather than 
the inmates. 
2.  Lack of Jurisdiction 
In a dissenting opinion that quoted Justice Douglas’s statement in 
Williams v. United States in an entirely different context, Justice Pro 
Tem Redmann of the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the following 
definition of a kangaroo court: 
An irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular tribunal, or one in which, 
although conducted under some authorization, the principles of law 
and justice are disregarded or perverted; as, [a] A mock court held by 
vagabonds or by prisoners in a jail. [b] An irregularly conducted minor 
court in a frontier or unsettled district. [c] Formerly, one of a number 
of courts in Ohio with county-wide jurisdiction, whose judge was paid 
only by fines and costs imposed by him upon conviction of accused 
persons.58 
 
 57. Id. at 829.  Despite his misgivings over the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 
guilty plea, Judge Seiler deferred the judgment of his colleagues “who, needless to say, also 
disapprove of what went on in the Green County jail [but] do not believe it can be said on the record 
before [them] that the court clearly erred in holding the jail treatment had no effect on the guilty 
plea.”  Id. at 830. 
 58. State v. Petterway, 403 So. 2d 1157, 1161-62 n.1 (La. 1981) (Redmann, J., dissenting) 
(quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d. ed)).  As one who was raised in Ohio, 
I was somewhat disturbed by the foregoing dictionary definition.  Then I read Judge Duffy’s 
opinion in Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959), which included the following lines: 
We must consider whether a justice of the peace is a judicial officer to which the 
common law immunity will apply. 
A case closely in point is Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 250 F.2d 700 [(6th Cir. 1957)].  
That case involved speed traps and alleged ‘Kangaroo Courts’ in the state of Ohio.  
While the court admits that the allegations, if true, present a sorry picture of local courts, 
it adheres to its earlier decision in Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 [(6th Cir. 1956)], and 
holds that common law judicial immunity must necessarily extend even to mayors’ 
courts in small villages. 
Id. at 240.  And as if Stift were not bad enough, I took a look at In re Von Uehn, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 
167, 1928 WL 3321 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. July 9, 1928), which arose in the following factual context: 
The relator is being held in jail on a commitment by the mayor of the village of Harrison 
in default of the payment of a fine of $500 on a liquor charge .  
Relator was arrested without warrant by a state prohibition officer at a camp on the 
Whitewater River, in Hamilton county, seven or eight miles from the corporate limits of 
12
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The issue in Petterway was the legitimacy of a Louisiana Supreme Court 
policy under which criminal appeals were heard, for several years, by 
panels composed of four Supreme Court justices and three judges of the 
Court of Appeals.59  In Justice Redmann’s view, it was his own presence 
that made the Supreme Court panel on which he sat a kangaroo court, for 
want of lawful jurisdiction.60 
In Brown v. United States,61 Judge Newcomer offered the 
following, nearly poetic, discourse on jurisdiction and kangaroo-ism: 
Our ideas of jurisdiction and its attributes have been formed over a 
thousand years of legal evolution.  They serve an immensely important 
role in describing to us the ways in which power is limited.  Their role 
is so important that they should be tampered with only for the most 
cogent reasons, for they are like a living organism:  It is difficult to 
predict all the consequences that even a small change in the traditional 
incidents of jurisdiction may have, or its effect on the vitality of those 
doctrines in protecting each of us from the arrogance of tyrannical 
power. 
 
Harrison, and taken by the officer to the mayor of Harrison . . . . 
What probably happened is that the mayor and state prohibition officer sat down cheek 
by jowl, conspired and soft pedalled relator into jail. 
Id. at *1.  Legally, the court characterized the circumstances as follows: 
[T]here are several grounds for the discharge of the relator, if we are to regard as of 
binding force fundamental law and principles of American government, the disregard of 
which as relates to the minor courts of the state in certain legislative policies, practices 
and court decisions leaves these courts subject to subsidization by individuals for selfish 
ends and by dominating reform groups in the interest of enforcing their particular 
reforms by penal action.  
. . . This group [of citizens promoting the enforcement of prohibition] actually secured 
legislation whereby the minor courts of this state were fixed for convictions in liquor 
cases and for seven or eight years, through the organization of such of the minor courts 
as it could lay hold of into liquor and kangaroo courts subjected the people to trials 
involving their liberty and property without due process of law. 
The court’s first ground for discharging the relator is that the mayor of Harrison, as well 
as all minor courts of this state similarly situated are without final jurisdiction in state 
liquor cases, according to the Supreme Court of the United States in the Tumey case.  
. . .  The mayor cannot revest himself with jurisdiction by merely waiving fees, nor can 
the defendant revest the court with jurisdiction it lost by the Tumey decision by a plea of 
guilty. 
Id. at *2.  (citing Tumey v. State, Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 580, 1925 WL 2525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 
1925)). Perhaps the outback is closer to home than I ever realized. 
 59. Petterway, 403 So. 2d at 1162. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (granting defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment in mandamus action in which plaintiffs, military personnel tried by special 
courts-martial, sought to have the district court order the Secretary of the Navy to apply ruling of 
the Court of Military Appeals retroactively). 
13
Potter: Kangaroo Courts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
POTTER1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:16:14 AM 
86 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:73 
Still, it must be admitted that sometimes the rigidity of traditional 
concepts of jurisdiction can have extreme effects which do not seem 
warranted.  Jurisdiction traditionally either exists or does not exist.  
The common law made no distinction between a kangaroo court, and a 
court whose judge had by mistake been issued the improper 
commission.  Both tribunals lacked jurisdiction equally. The 
proceedings of both tribunals were totally void.  The common law 
looked not to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the decisions 
which had led to the exercise of power, but to its metaphysical 
presence or absence. 
This Draconian conceptual approach gives maximum protection 
against the improper assumption and exercise of power.  No 
circumstance can ratify its exercise, no appearance of reasonable 
mistake can vindicate its assumption, and consequently there are no 
rewards to be gained and held by its improper exercise. And this 
approach was well suited to the conditions of most of our legal 
history.62 
In Lambert v. Blackwell,63 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
explained that an Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”) claim “must be adjudicated by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, as opposed to a kangaroo court or an administrative body 
masquerading as a court.”64  And according to Judge Easterbrook, in an 
opinion in a habeas corpus case, 
Shortly after Congress extended federal power to state prisoners, the 
Supreme Court began pouring more into the vessel of “jurisdiction.”  
In 1915 the Court equated a kangaroo court with lack of jurisdiction 
and by 1942 the distinction between “no jurisdiction” and “grievous 
error” had eroded so substantially that the Court discarded the 
limitation.65 
Acting without jurisdiction is one of the most common behaviors 
covered by the concept of kangaroo-ism.66 
 
 62. Id. at 345. 
 63. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 64. Id. at 238. 
 65. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
 66. On the other hand, when jurisdiction is proper, a judge can escape liability, at least under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the operation of a kangaroo court.  See Weiland v. Stillo, No. 88 C 10391 
1989 WL 165058 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1989) (stating “[t]hus, even accepting as true Weiland’s 
allegations of conspiracy, corruption, and a ‘kangaroo court,’ there are no facts alleged showing a 
clear absence of jurisdiction and the complaint [alleging civil rights violations] must be dismissed 
with respect to Stillo and Campion [two judges]”). 
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3.  Other Defects 
While fewer courts have espoused the following theories, there is 
no shortage of ways in which a tribunal can exhibit kangaroo-ism.  In 
Rideau v. State of Louisiana,67 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 
divided court, characterized the extensive pre-trial publicity surrounding 
a criminal prosecution as creating a “kangaroo court proceeding[] . . . 
that involved a . . . real deprivation of due process of law.”68  And 
 
 67. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). 
 68. Id. at 726.  In that case, the defendant was arrested, and the following morning, his 
twenty-minute “interview” with the county sheriff was filmed.  Id. at 724.  In the interview, the 
defendant admitted his guilt.  Id.  Over the course of the next three days, the interview was 
broadcast to television audiences totaling 97,000 viewers, in a county with a population of 
approximately 150,000.  Id.  In an opinion reversing the defendant’s conviction, Justice Stewart 
explained: 
Under our Constitution’s guarantee of due process, a person accused of committing a 
crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights.  Among these are the right to counsel, the right 
not to plead guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge.  Yet 
in this case the people of Calcasieu Parish saw and heard, not once but three times, a 
“trial” of Rideau in a jail, presided over by a sheriff, where there was no lawyer to advise 
Rideau of his right to stand mute. 
Id. at 726-727. 
  Justice Stewart’s kangaroo court language in Rideau is often cited, but usually in opinions 
holding that a defendant’s trial has not been tainted by publicity. See, e.g., United States v. 
McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).  In McVeigh, the court of appeals explained: 
The circumstances that led the Court to presume prejudice in Sheppard [v. Maxwell], 
Estes [v. Texas], and Rideau simply do not exist in this case.  First, McVeigh’s attempt 
to show presumed prejudice is substantially weakened by the fact that, unlike the 
defendants in Sheppard and Rideau, he did receive a change in venue, removing his trial 
from the eye of the emotional storm in Oklahoma to the calmer metropolitan climate of 
Denver.  Second, mere television images of the defendant in prison garb being led 
through an angry crowd do not come close to the type of inflammatory publicity required 
to reach the disruptive force seen in Sheppard, Estes, and Rideau. 
Id. at 1182.  In Burgess v. State, 827 So. 2d 134 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), the court of appeals 
distinguished Rideau in the following way: 
[T]he confession in Rideau was described by an indignant United States Supreme Court 
as a televised “kangaroo court” presided over by the sheriff, in which the accused, 
flanked by two state troopers, confessed in response to the sheriff’s leading questions.  
Unlike Rideau, there is no evidence in this case that the admission to reporters was 
contrived by law enforcement or that it resulted from a conspiracy between the police 
and the media.  The videotape of Burgess’s admission . . . shows a sober, relaxed 
Burgess walking across the courthouse parking lot, escorted by two police investigators, 
as he responded in a composed, thoughtful, and articulate manner to questions posed by 
news reporters. 
Id. at 160.  And in State v. Coty, 229 A.2d 205 (Me. 1967), the Maine Supreme Court reached a 
similar result: 
Rideau seems to us readily distinguishable upon its facts. It is evident that the justice 
below took a very serious view, as do we, of the television “documentary” which 
furnished the principal basis of the respondents’ demand for change of venue.  He took 
every proper precaution to make certain that no adverse effects of this program entered 
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Justice Harlan stated, in his concurring opinion in California v. Green,69 
that “[d]ue process does not permit a conviction based on no evidence, 
or on evidence so unreliable and untrustworthy that it may be said that 
the accused had been tried by a kangaroo court.”70 
In Curry v. Pulliam,71 an elementary-school custodian challenged 
both the fact of his termination and the manner in which it was carried 
out.  In her opinion, Judge Barker explained: “Mr. Curry argues that [his 
termination] hearing was, in effect, a kangaroo court because the 
outcome was predetermined.  Manifestly, if a public employer holds a 
sham hearing, the terminated employee has not been accorded due 
process and his claim should survive summary judgment.”72  Regarding 
what a sham hearing might look like, in a prisoner’s challenge to the 
procedures used in a disciplinary proceeding, Magistrate Judge Marbry 
opined that the defendant’s reading of Superintendent v. Hill73 “would 
turn prison disciplinary boards into no more than kangaroo courts: where 
 
the jury room.  He could properly consider that the “documentary” had been shown but 
once and that it did not transmit the voices or conversation of any participants.  He could 
take account of the fact that it was viewed by a limited audience at a point in time 
months removed from the date of trial.  The evidence supported a finding that at the time 
of trial whatever effect it may have had originally had been greatly diluted and 
diminished and the memory of it, even on the part of those who had once seen it, had 
grown dim.  It did not, of course, contain the admissions or confessions deemed so vital 
in Rideau.  Finally, and most importantly, the presiding justice permitted the respondents 
to challenge for cause any prospective juror who had seen the entire film or any 
objectionable parts of it. . . . [T]he safeguards which were seasonably employed by the 
court below were adequate to overcome any residual effects of the “documentary” and 
insure the respondents a fair trial. 
Id. at 213.  See also Tunstall v. Hopkins, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1206-07 (N.D. Iowa 2000); United 
States v. Wright, No. 401CR3040, 2002 WL 842208, at *5 (D. Neb. May 3, 2002) (stating 
“[a]lthough the media publicized quotes taken from interviews with the defendant and certain of his 
family members in this case, the news coverage here is not at all similar to the ‘kangaroo court 
proceedings’ described in Rideau”); State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999, 1009 (Ariz. 1994). 
 In People v. Frogge, 75 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), the California Court of Appeal 
explicated the logic of a failed Rideau claim: 
The pretrial publicity was not injected into the trial by any particular act or fact, and 
defendants can do no more than point objectively to the pretrial publicity and to the 
jury’s verdict.  But this does not demonstrate prejudice; it is, in substance, an argument 
that the evidence does not support the verdict and, a fortiori, that the verdict resulted 
from the influence of prejudicial pretrial publicity. 
Id. at 521. 
 69. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 70. Id. at 186-87. 
 71. Curry v. Pulliam, 234 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 72. Id. at 928. 
 73. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985) (determining that a court reviewing the 
decision of a prison disciplinary board should rule that the prisoner has received due process if the 
disciplinary board’s decision is based on “some evidence”). 
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evidence is placed on an unbalanced scale, with incriminating evidence 
being given full weight and exculpatory evidence given no weight.”74  In 
a case in which a police chief challenged his termination, Judge Blue of 
the Connecticut Superior Court suggested setting aside the result of an 
administrative hearing “[i]f it appears from the record that [the] hearing 
was essentially a kangaroo court.”75 Judge Blue cited Staton v. Mayes76 
as support for disregarding the outcome of an administrative hearing 
“where the administrative hearings at issue were summary or 
nonexistent and it was clear from the record that there was a determined 
purpose to reach a predetermined end.”77 
In a dissenting opinion in a case that involved public access to 
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, Justice Anstead wrote: 
“Indeed, some contend that without openness, even traditional juvenile 
proceedings ‘have the potential to become “little more than kangaroo 
courts where judges rubber-stamp agency requests.”’”78  Thus, while too 
much publicity can create a kangaroo court,79 kangaroo-ism may also 
result from too little public scrutiny of judicial decision making.80 
Cale v. Johnson81 was a Bivins action that resulted when a prison 
official planted contraband on a prisoner in order to retaliate against 
him.82  In an opinion concurring with the majority’s decision to reverse 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants, 
Judge Nelson opined: 
For the government knowingly to railroad someone into confinement 
by planting false evidence on his person is directly comparable, by my 
lights, to railroading a person into confinement through a kangaroo 
court proceeding in which the accused has no opportunity to be heard. 
Both procedures strike me as the very antithesis of “due process” in the 
 
 74. Williams v. Wilkinson, 132 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (granting in part 
prisoner’s request for injunctive relief and ordering prison to implement policy allowing prisoners 
brought before disciplinary board to call witnesses). 
 75. Clisham v. Bd. Of Police Comm’rs of the Bourough of Naugatuck, No. 090211, 1991 WL 
158159, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 613 A.2d 254 (Conn. 
1992).  
       76.   Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977). 
       77.   Clisham, 1991 WL 158159, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  78. Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 780 So. 2d 6, 14-15 
(Fla. 2001) (Anstead, J., dissenting) (quoting Jan. L. Trasen, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile 
Court Proceedings: Do Closed Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 359, 362 (quoting Sandy Bauers, Fighting to Lift the Veil on Child Welfare, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Aug. 15, 1993, at E1)). 
 79. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963). 
 80. Natural Parents of J.B., 780 So. 2d at 14-15. 
 81. Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 82. Id. at 944. 
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true sense of that term.83 
And in an opinion denying injunctive relief to students who had been 
suspended from their university, after receiving a disciplinary hearing, 
Judge Carswell noted that “[t]hese hearings were not precipitously or 
secretly convened ‘Kangaroo’ courts stripping one of a fair and 
reasonable chance to give account of his version of the case.”84 
In Garland v. State,85 Justice Marshall of the Georgia Supreme 
Court provided a good thumbnail definition of kangaroo-ism.  In that 
case, the majority reversed the trial court’s conviction of an attorney for 
criminal contempt, based upon statements he had given in an interview 
with a newspaper reporter.86  Justice Marshall dissented: 
I cannot conceive of more contemptuous statements, short of 
obscenity, than those made by the appellant: “That the trial court had 
conducted ‘a sham proceeding’; that the trial court’s ‘conducting an 
inquisition was unlawful and improper’; that ‘[t]his is a political effort 
to turn a tragedy into political hay for’ the trial judge and that ‘it 
stinks’; . . .”  Paraphrased, appellant accused the judge of running a 
“Kangaroo court,” acting as an inquisitor, using the court as a political 
vehicle, and, in sum, conducting an operation that smells to high 
heaven. Such statements cannot fail to obstruct justice in the South 
Georgia Circuit and the State of Georgia. 
Justice Marshall’s dissent leaves little doubt as to his definition of 
kangaroo-ism. 
 
 83. Id. at 953-54. 
 84. Due v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963).  Judge 
Carswell elaborated: 
There was notice to each of these plaintiffs, the charge was made explicit, and each was 
afforded full opportunity to be heard, and, in fact, was heard to the point where each said 
he had nothing more to say. 
A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary to due process 
requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by a university disciplinary 
committee with qualified attorneys either present or formally waived as in a felonious 
charge under the criminal law.  There need be no stenographic or mechanical recording 
of the proceedings.  
. . .  The touchstones in this area are fairness and reasonableness.  
. . .  
There are no magic words of incantation which will guarantee this, but, by the same 
token, the difficulty cannot be the excuse for not making every effort to see that fairness 
is accomplished. 
This is the standard by which this case must be decided. 
Id. 
 85. Garland v. State, 325 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. 1985). 
 86. Id. at 134. 
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Finally, however, there are some irregularities in trial procedure 
that, while unusual, do not qualify as kangaroo-ism.  For example, in 
People v. Partee,87 a criminal defendant was convicted in absentia after 
failing to return to court after the State rested.88  In rejecting the State’s 
argument that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant’s 
appeal because the defendant never moved the trial court for a hearing to 
determine whether his absence from court was willful,89 the Illinois 
Supreme Court explained: “Section 115-4.1 [of the Illinois Code of 
Criminal Procedure] provides for a trial in absentia.  It does not create a 
kangaroo court.”90  And moving beyond the realm of trial procedure, 
Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once wrote, in 
the majority opinion in a fascinating case involving courts that had run 
amok and collided with the executive and legislative branches of 
government, that “[i]f Council decides to pay less or more salary for a 
judge’s law clerk, it is not constituting itself a kangaroo court.”91 
4.  Hypothetical Kangaroo-ism 
Not only have judges stated directly the characteristics that make a 
court marsupial, others have defined kangaroo-ism hypothetically, as in 
“if X, Y, or Z took place, then the decision-maker who did those things 
was running a kangaroo court.”  In Austin v. American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons,92 in which Donald Austin sued the Association 
for taking disciplinary action against him, Judge Bucklo granted the 
Association’s motion for summary judgment, noting in his order: 
The AANS proceedings in Dr. Austin’s case more than met these 
standards [i.e., the requirements for a fair hearing].  He does not 
 
 87. People v. Partee, 530 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 1988). 
 88. Id. at 461. 
 89. Id. at 462-63. 
 90. Id. at 463. 
 91. Smith v. Gallagher, 185 A.2d 135, 159 (Pa. 1962), overruled by In re Biester, 409 A.2d 
848 (Pa. 1962).  As a law clerk myself, I might well be inclined to use terms a bit more pointed than 
“kangaroo court” to describe a legislative body that decided to pay less salary for a judge’s law 
clerk, but that is neither here nor there. 
  What is both here and there, however, is Justice Musmanno’s reputation as a judicial 
wordsmith.  See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Surveying the Serbonian Bog: A Brief History of a Judicial 
Metaphor, 28 TUL. MAR. L. J. 519, nn. 109, 148  & 177 (2004) (discussing Justice Musmanno’s 
references to the sargasso sea, twisting the law by the tail, and painting the lily); Parker B. Potter, 
Jr., A Good Piece of Paper Spoiled: An Eighteen-Hole Round-Up of American Hole-in-One 
Jurisprudence, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 180-81 (2004) (quoting Justice 
Musmanno’s zesty dissent in Taylor v. Churchill Valley Country Club, 228 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1967)). 
 92. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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dispute that he received written notice of the charges, with prior 
disclosure of all documents considered in the case, or that he was 
allowed to present his arguments before an AANS Committee and to 
cross-examine witnesses, or that he received two levels of appeal and 
was allowed to have representation by counsel at all stages of the 
proceedings.  Unless the whole thing was a sham conducted in bad 
faith, a kangaroo court run with the cynical purpose of harming him 
while pretending to be fair, Dr. Austin received as much due process as 
anyone might hope for.93 
In a special concurrence in McKinney v. Pate,94 Judge Tjoflat 
stated: “Assuming McKinney’s allegations to be true, he is the victim of 
an illegal kangaroo court”95 that presided over “a proceeding [that] was 
admittedly random and unauthorized.”96  McKinney’s principal 
allegation was that he had been discharged from his position as the 
Osceola County (Florida) Building Official after a hearing “held before 
the [Osceola] Board [of County Commissioners] itself, instead of the 
Personnel Committee as provided for by the county’s policies.”97 
In a per curiam opinion reversing the district court’s dismissal of a 
prisoner civil rights action, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
explained, again in a hypothetical manner: 
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that in retaliation for the exercise of his 
right to file grievances, he was wrongfully retaliated against.  
Allegedly, the form of retaliation not only involved the filing of 
trumped-up misconduct charges but also their resolution in a kangaroo 
court held without authorization by the officers who wrote the 
misconduct violations. This certainly states a colorable legal claim….98 
In a dissenting opinion in In re Soto,99 Justice Dye agreed with the 
argument advanced by discharged employees at an arbitration 
 
 93. Id. at 1154. 
 94. McKinney v. Pate, 85 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated en banc, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th 
Cir. 1994). 
 95. Id. at 1514. 
 96. Id. at 1514-15. 
 97. Id. at 1503-04.  McKinney testified that one of the commissioners twice asked for his 
resignation, and that when he told the commissioner that there was no reason to fire him, the 
commissioner replied: “I don’t have anything.  But I’ll get something.”  Id.  McKinney also 
produced “substantial evidence” to support his claim that his termination was pretextual.  Id.  
McKinney was ultimately vacated, and Judge Tjoflat’s special concurrence became, in essence, the 
majority opinion of the en banc panel. McKinney v. Pate, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir. 1993), reheard en 
banc, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 98. Marcilis v. Bertucci, 985 F.2d 560 (unpublished table decision), No. 92-1176, 1993 WL 
20534, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1993). 
 99. In re Soto, 165 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1960) (Dye, J., dissenting). 
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proceeding, that if they were forced to proceed at an arbitration hearing 
represented by a union lawyer “who [had once previously] appeared as 
of counsel to the attorneys for the employer in an injunction proceeding 
to enjoin [them] from picketing,”100 they “would be in effect defendants 
in a kangaroo court.”101  Finally, in an order denying a criminal 
defendant’s motion to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to a hearing 
on a motion to continue his trial due to physical incapacity, Magistrate 
Judge Alexander noted that “the trial of a mental incompetent in our 
adversary system would not be a trial at all; it would be a ‘kangaroo 
court,’ [and that] the integrity of our system of justice would be not only 
compromised, but verily destroyed if mental incompetents were allowed 
to stand trial.”102 
B.  Litigant Observations 
Judges are not the only players in the courtroom drama to have had 
a hand in defining the term “kangaroo court;” litigants, too, have offered 
their opinions regarding the characteristic behavior of the marsupial 
decision-maker.  In Brobson v. Borough of New Hope,103 the Borough’s 
former police chief appealed his termination and contended that the 
Borough deprived him of due process by reorganizing the Civil Service 
Commission during the course of his appeal, “dissolv[ing] Commission 
A and appoint[ing] Commission B, a ‘kangaroo court’ that did not hear 
live testimony or allow Plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard.”104  The right to be heard was also an issue in Jones v. Iron 
Workers District Council Pension Trust,105 in which Judge Barker ruled 
that the plaintiff, a union member challenging the termination of his 
pension benefits, had  “a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate to the 
trustees that he had not engaged in ‘Disqualifying Employment,’”106 
despite the following testimony by affidavit: 
I can only liken that hearing to a “kangaroo court” because I was given 
very little chance to say anything and the questions that they asked me 
were repeated over and over with no let up until they were suggestive 
 
 100. Id. at 857. 
 101. Id. 
 102. United States v. Zannino, No. 83-235-N, 1985 WL 2305, at *2 (D. Mass. June 5, 1985). 
 103. Brobson v. Borough of New Hope, No. CIV. A. 00-0003, 2000 WL 1738669 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 22, 2000). 
 104. Id. at *3.  Judge Bechtle was persuaded that the plaintiff’s argument was sufficient to 
defeat the defendant’s motion to dismiss his procedural due process claim.  Id. 
 105. Jones v. Iron Workers Dist. Counsel Pension Trust, 829 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Ind. 1993). 
 106. Id. at 272. 
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of what they wanted.  Over and over again I was asked what was my 
job.  I would tell . . . them more and more and they would isolate part 
of my answer and try to make it sound silly.  The attorney for the 
union at one time said to me, “You were just a high-priced secretary.”  
It was obvious to me the appeal was a sham.107 
Another complaint that frequently leads to accusations of kangaroo-
ism is bias.  In a case involving the legality of imposing a trusteeship 
over a local labor union, the trustee “heard that Pope [the business 
manager] was telling the members [of the local] that the [trusteeship] 
hearing was going to be a ‘kangaroo court’ because, in Pope’s opinion, 
the outcome was a foregone conclusion.”108  In an age-discrimination 
action against his employer, the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), John Murphy claimed that when 
he was finally granted a post-termination hearing, “the proceedings were 
biased against him because the arbitrator was a SEPTA employee who 
conducted a ‘kangaroo court’ and refused to hear his counsel’s 
objections.”109  And in Morgan v. Ward,110 a plaintiff in a § 1983111 
action brought by prisoners against various prison officials “refused to 
leave his cell to attend Adjustment Committee Proceedings,”112 on 
grounds that “he felt that the Adjustment Committee was a ‘kangaroo 
court’ that perfunctorily credited false or trivial charges made by 
Clinton’s correctional officers.”113 
Procedural irregularity is another common concern that inspires 
litigants to drop the K-bomb.  In his denaturalization proceeding, Ferenc 
Koreh argued that his 1947 conviction for a war crime, by the People’s 
Court of Hungary, resulted from a “trial . . . before a ‘kangaroo court’ 
dominated by Communists and that he was denied most of the 
procedural protections a defendant enjoys in this country.”114  In United 
 
 107. Id. at 272 n.4. 
 108. Thompson v. Office & Prof’l Employees Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 74 F.3d 1492, 1498 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
 109. Murphy v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Civ. A. No. 93-3213, 1993 WL 313133, at  *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 9, 1993). 
 110. Morgan v. Ward, 699 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 112. Morgan, 699 F. Supp. at 1044. 
 113. Id.  Judge Munson found that “[t]here [was] no evidence that this opinion had a basis in 
fact.”  Id. 
 114. United States v. Koreh, 856 F. Supp. 891, 896 (D.N.J. 1994) (granting summary judgment 
for the government on grounds that Koreh was ineligible for a visa he had received due to wartime 
activities which included advocating and assisting in persecution of Jews, assisting the enemy in 
persecuting civilians, and participating in movement hostile to the United States). 
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States v. Noblitt,115 an appeal from a parole revocation, Horace Noblitt 
argued that the conviction that led to the sentence from which he had 
been paroled was the result of a “kangaroo court” because at his trial, he 
was “never allowed to represent [himself] and was ‘forced to use a 
Public Defender.’”116  Finally, regarding “the proper composition of, and 
procedures to be followed by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board,”117 
Justice Larsen charged the Board with “kangaroo court proceedings”118 
based upon his view that the applicable procedure for appellate review 
allowed the Board to “‘establish its own composition,’ ‘play it by ear[,]’ 
‘make it up as it goes along[,]’ and ‘keep doing it over until it gets it 
right.’”119 
Then there is State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff,120 in 
which John Siliznoff claimed that the actions of the State Rubbish 
Collectors Association board of directors in settling a dispute between 
him and another rubbish collector caused him emotional distress which 
manifested itself in physical symptoms.121  At trial: 
The argument to the jury by counsel for Siliznoff consisted of a bitter 
denunciation of the methods and motives of the directors of the 
association.  They were accused of holding a “Kangaroo Court” with 
methods inconsistent with “good,” decent, American business; and 
with forcing their decision upon innocent people and who needed a 
“trouncing”; they were compared with people who poison horses, cut 
tires, smash windows, blackjack their victims and throw acid upon 
customers’ clothes.  It was suggested that something evil might happen 
to the “brave” witnesses who came to testify for Siliznoff.  The 
arbitration procedure of the by-laws was ridiculed as illegal, arbitrary 
and unauthorized.122 
The jury was persuaded by Siliznoff’s tale of woe and awarded 
compensatory and exemplary damages for the emotional distress he 
claimed to have suffered from the Association’s kangaroo-ism.123  The 
court of appeals, presumably being made of sterner stuff than the jury, 
 
 115. United States v. Noblitt,983 F.2d 1079 (unpublished table decision), No. 92-50025, 1993 
WL 5176 (9th Cir. Jan 11, 2993). 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Larsen v. Kaufmann, 579 A.2d 1302, 1302 (Pa. 1990) (Papadakos, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 235 P.2d 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951), aff’d, 240 
P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952). 
 121. Id. at 96. 
 122. Id. at 100. 
 123. Id. 
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was unmoved, and reversed the damages award.124 
Interestingly – with the possible exception of Siliznoff – it would 
appear that as a general matter, litigant definitions of kangaroo-ism track 
closely the definitions that have been framed on the other side of the 
bench. 
C.  Synonyms for the Metaphor 
Finally, while “kangaroo court” is itself a metaphor, it should come 
as no surprise that the term kangaroo court itself now has a whole mob 
of synonyms such as: “kangaroo ass court,”125 “Kangaroo Style 
Court,”126 “kangaroo courtroom,”127 “kangaroo justice,”128 “kangaroo 
form of justice,”129 “kangaroo proceeding,”130 “kangaroo-like 
 
 124. Id. at 101. 
 125. State v. Parrish, No. CA2000-10-199, 2002 WL 31256647, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7, 
2002).  The Ohio Court of Appeals’ per curiam opinion provides the following context for Parrish’s 
striking neologisim: 
When appellant refused to behave properly, the trial court set up a separate room with a 
video and audio feed so that appellant could participate in his trial without being in the 
courtroom.  When the bailiff attempted to take him up to the room he stated, “Yeah.  Do 
what you want to do.  How the hell you gonna have me go to trial when I ain’t got no – 
my witnesses ain’t present or nothing.  This shit is unconstitution (SIC) – this shit you all 
doin’ ain’t right to a black man.”  Then he further commented, “What the fuck you 
talking about?  This crazy ass court.  This kangaroo ass court.”  
Id.  It is not clear from the opinion what role, if any, is played by the backside of a kangaroo 
adjudicator in the maladministration of justice, nor does the opinion give any indication why the ass 
of a kangaroo is any more offensive than any of the other asses in the animal kingdom, including 
what I would think to be the worst: the ass of an ass. 
 126. Anderson v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 521 F.2d 420, 421 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 127. United States v. Reynolds, 10 Fed. Appx. 62, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming district 
court’s decision, at sentencing, to deny criminal defendant offense level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility when defendant, at trial, “accused the judge of being ‘part of the group’ and of 
running a ‘kangaroo courtroom’ and stated that it was his intention to disrupt the courtroom and that 
the court would have to ‘cuff and gag’ him”). 
 128. Ayers v. Ciccone, 303 F. Supp. 637, 640 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (quoting letter from 
prisoner to social worker, in which prisoner complained that he was “a victim of ‘kangaroo’ justice, 
had had a ‘phony’ charge placed against him, and was in need of legal aid”). 
 129. Gibbs-Alfanso v. Ossining Boat & Canoe Club, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385-86 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting plaintiff’s letter complaining about process by which she was suspended 
by boat club for raising concerns about sexual harassment and substance abuse on club property). 
 130. Fotiades v. Hi-Tech Auto Collision Painting Servs., Inc., No. E029854, 2001 WL 
1239716, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001) (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 729 P.2d 
743, 745 (Cal. 1987) (en banc) (discussing disciplinary proceeding brought against firefighter by 
panel of battalion chiefs)).  See also Smith v. Hilltown Twp., No. Civ. A. 88-2615, 1988 WL 
115769, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1988) (“Plaintiffs liken defendants’ consideration of their site 
development applications to ‘the type of kangaroo proceedings imposed on blacks in the south [sic] 
when they registered to vote.’”); In re Wolfson, 453 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(quoting twenty-seven-page letter circulated by petitioner for post-conviction relief accusing trial 
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proceeding,”131 “kangaroo process,”132 “Kangaroo type court process,”133 
“kangaroo hearing[],”134 “kangaroo trial,”135 “‘kangaroo’ disciplinary 
proceeding,”136 “kangaroo kind of a deal,”137 and “summary kangaroo 
 
judge of “conducting ‘kangaroo’ proceedings, of having shown favoritism to highly publicized 
criminals and mafia figures . . . [and] of participating in a ‘scheme to frame’ him and of 
‘railroading’ him”); In re Yoder, 682 N.E.2d 753, 754 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (“When the court asked 
the petitioner [who sought discharge from involuntary confinement in a mental institution] if he 
wished to testify, he asserted that he did want to do so, ‘but in a real legal proceeding, not a 
kangaroo proceeding.’”); Swope v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 303 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. 1957) 
(“Plaintiffs say this was done [i.e., they cut short their use of the grievance process] because the 
hearings proved to be a mere ‘kangaroo’ proceeding, or sham . . .”): Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs 
v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 638 (Pa. 1977) (quoting the trial court, “We are convinced that the 
Respondent [in a child custody proceeding] has been less than candid in many respects.  Our first 
indication was her response to the Florida proceeding.  When recounting it in Court, she purported 
to break down and sob at the very recollection of a horrible one-sided kangaroo proceeding.”). 
 131. Morris v. Peyton, 264 F. Supp. 911, 914 (W.D. Va. 1967) (“There being no kangaroo-like 
proceeding in the instant case, Spano [v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)] is easily distinguishable 
from it.”). 
 132. Gierbolini Colon v. Aponte Roque, 666 F. Supp. 334, 338 (D.P.R. 1987). 
 133. Horton v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M1999-02798-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31126656, at 
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2002) (quoting argument of prisoner/plaintiff who claimed that 
president of private prison company was necessary party in his suit challenging two prison 
disciplinary actions). 
 134. In re Jones, 747 So. 2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (La. 1999) (quoting attorney’s objection to 
disbarment).  In response to Jones’s objection, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: 
  Moreover, we are disturbed by the language respondent has used in his pleadings in the 
instant matter.  Respondent’s characterization of the disciplinary process as “kangaroo 
hearings” and his exhortation to the disciplinary board to take the committee report and 
“shove it up your ass” displays a shocking lack of respect for the disciplinary authorities 
which act under the auspices of this court. 
Id. at 1084-85. 
 135. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 611 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining in a case 
about television cameras in the courtroom: “But we do not deal here with mob domination of a 
courtroom, with a kangaroo trial, with a prejudiced judge or a jury inflamed with bias.”); Sweeden 
v. United States, 209 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 1954) (quoting convicted defendant’s post-trial letter 
to the trial judge); Schmidt v. State, 265 N.E.2d 219, 228 (Ind. 1970) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting the plea in abatement of a criminal defendant charged with murdering her husband: “This 
improper, televised press conference called by said [police chief] Null, conducted by him and 
Stewart’s attorney at Marion City Hall, amounted to a public kangaroo trial of this defendant 
effectively designed to prejudice potential jurors against her and to deprive her of her constitutional 
right to a fair trial, by an impartial jury, in this county.”); McCraw v. Adcox, 399 S.W.2d 753, 754 
(Tenn. 1966) (quoting motion by pro se defendant in replevin action, who was found in contempt: 
“Defendant is aware of the fact that Attorney Keith Harber and Judge James F. Morgan plan a star 
chamber court proceeding or kangaroo trial for the alleged writ of replevin.”); State v. Garcia, 600 
P.2d 1010, 1014 (Wash. 1979) (reporting dialogue between judge and indigent criminal defendant 
who argued that representation by court-appointed attorney would result in “kangaroo trial”). 
 136. Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1064 (Cal. 1990) (paraphrasing Cole v. Fair Oaks 
Fire Prot. Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 745 (Cal. 1987) (en banc)). 
 137. United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1143 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting prosecutor’s 
closing argument in sexual assault case). 
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practice.”138  Other opinions refer to courts operating in “kangaroo 
fashion”139 and to a district attorney who referred to “a certain question, 
propounded by the counsel for the defendant to a state’s witness on 
cross-examination, a ‘kangaroo question.’”140  Moreover, kangaroo-ism 
seems not to be confined to adjudications on the merits; reference has 
been made to a “kangaroo grand jury,”141 a “‘kangaroo’ preliminary 
 
 138. In re Rauch, 390 F.2d 760, 761 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (referring to appellant’s contention “that 
the alleged ‘summary’ ‘kangaroo’ practice accorded him by the Patent Office deprived him of an 
opportunity to amend his claims, thus denying him due process of law”). 
 139. Fiorella v. State, 121 So. 2d 875, 880 (Ala. Ct. App. 1960).  In a contempt proceeding in 
the Wyoming Supreme Court brought against an applicant for admission to the Wyoming bar, the 
court quoted the following statement, published by the bar applicant, during the pendency of his 
contempt proceeding: “There is no doubt that the minds of the judges are poisoned and that I have 
been found guilty of contempt long ago.  This trial is a mere formality as was the trial when Judge 
Stanton removed my name from the ballot in kangaroo fashion.”  In re Stone, 305 P.2d 777, 798-99 
(Wyo. 1957).  The foregoing statement, supplemented by host of other misdeeds, earned Norman 
Stone six months in jail plus a fine of $1,000.  Id. at 799. 
 140. State v. Morgan, 77 So. 588, 593 (La. 1918).  Regarding the propriety of the remark, 
Judge Leche noted: “The remark was perhaps not altogether respectful to the learned counsel for the 
defendant, but it was not prejudicial to the accused.”  Id. 
 141. United States v. Sigma Int’l, Inc., 244 F.3d 841, 856 (11th Cir. 2001).  While the court 
was speaking hypothetically rather than accusing any particular grand jury of kangaroo-ism, its 
discussion of potential kangaroo-ism in the grand jury process is instructive: 
It is clear, for example, that if a prosecutor simply drew up an “indictment,” had a grand 
jury foreperson sign it, and then used it to charge the defendant with a criminal offense, 
we would dismiss the “indictment” out of hand as violative of the Fifth Amendment. . . .    
So, too, would we dismiss an indictment that was issued by a “kangaroo grand jury” – 
one whose deliberations were so overborne by a prosecutor or judge that the indictment 
was, in effect, the prosecutor’s or judge’s handiwork, and not the result of a considered 
judgment by an independently functioning grand jury. 
Id. 
  In United States v. Lamantia, 856 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1994), Judge Duff dismissed 
several indictments handed down by a grand jury that included one member who was “convicted of 
contempt of court, bribery and obstruction of justice for selling information pertaining to the Special 
October 1992 – I Grand Jury.”  Id. at 425.  That grand juror also “expressed considerable disrespect 
for the process, calling the grand jury proceedings a ‘kangaroo court’ where anyone could be 
indicted.”  Id.  In explaining the role of the grand jury, Judge Duff observed that 
[t]he right to an indictment by a legally constituted, impartial grand jury is explicitly 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution . . . [and] must mean more than 
an indictment by a body consisting of at least one member who viewed the proceedings 
as a “kangaroo court” and was willing to trade his solemn obligations for cash. 
Id. at 426.  Ultimately, Judge Duff was reversed on grounds that the defendants whose indictments 
were dismissed did not demonstrate that they had been prejudiced by the grand juror misconduct 
they identified.  See United States v. Lamantia, 59 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1995). 
  In a case involving claims that an indictment should be dismissed because the prosecutor 
gave informal immunity to certain grand jury witnesses, Judge Van Sickle explained, “[T]he most 
important function of a grand jury is to stand between the prosecutor and the suspect as unbiased 
evaluators of the evidence.  If they do not perform this function then the procedure and the 
safeguard contained therein is at best a farce and at worst a kangaroo court.” United States v. 
Kouba, 632 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D.N.D. 1986) (emphasis in the original). 
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hearing,”142 and a “Kangaroo Parole Revocation Hearing.”143 
Sometimes, the metaphor is stripped down to its essence, as when 
Robert Elmore sought the recusal of the judge in his criminal trial and 
stated, in front of the jury, no less: “He won’t dismiss himself.  He say 
I’m number two dope seller.  He’s the king.  He’s the kangaroo, so he 
ain’t going to try me.”144  In a similar vein, John Oppenheimer once 
referred to Judge Harold Shepherd as “a kangaroo artist, a distorter and 
perverter of law and justice.”145 
Finally, in perhaps its most impressive iteration, the word 
“kangaroo” has been pressed into service as a verb.  In Hale v. State,146 a 
defendant charged with a traffic violation was tried on the courthouse 
lawn, in a proceeding attended by between two hundred and three 
hundred people standing in a circle eight or ten deep, some of them in 
direct contact with the jury.147  The defendant’s conviction was reversed, 
in part because a spectator commented, within earshot of the jury, that 
“[t]hey have been kangarooing people at the City Hall; they have 
kangarooed the wrong man this time.”148 
 
 142. Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ind. 1973). 
 143. Moore v. Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 736, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
 144. People v. Elmore, 285 N.W.2d 417, 419 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 145. People v. Oppenheimer, 26 Cal. Rptr. 18, 21 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).  Oppenheimer was 
more than a little miffed at Judge Shepherd; in addition to calling the judge a “kangaroo artist,” he 
also called him “Fascist, Nazi and Tyrant” (on the envelope containing his letter to the judge), 
“Dirty Bastard, Swindler, Asshole, Tyrant, Oppressor, Schyster, Fascist, Nazi, Crook, Scoundrel, 
Gangster Harold C. Shepherd, Bandit, Rat, Devil, S.O.B.” (in the salutation), and, in the body of the 
letter, “dirty dog, bastard, and rat,” “murderer of/right and/justice” “un-American prick” and “half-
judge.”  Id.  He sent similar letters to three other judges.  Id. 
 146. Hale v. State, 47 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932). 
 147. Id. at 835.  Specifically, the defendant was charged with blocking an intersection with his 
truck.  Id. at 834.  The defendant had been sitting in the bed of a truck parked near an intersection 
which was approached, from behind, by a car containing two police officers.  Id.  When the 
defendant motioned for the officers to drive around, one of them told him “you don’t know who we 
are, do you?”  Id.  Subsequently, the driver and the passenger were both arrested and taken to the 
city hall where whey were told by a judge that the fine for their violation was three dollars.  Id.  
When the defendant refused to pay, he was taken to jail, and ultimately put on trial.  Id. 
  While the opinion in Hale does not indicate the defendant’s race, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that Algea Caffey’s statement, as reported in In re Caffey, 441 P.2d 933 (Cal. 1968), 
applies equally to the defendant in Hale: “In his verified petition petitioner alleges that he is a Negro 
and that courts in the southern states customarily meted out ‘kangaroo court’ justice to Negroes.”  
Id. at 938. 
 148. Hale, 47 S.W.2d at 834-35.  Another spectator commented: “They just pick a man up and 
kangaroo him in the City hall.”  Id. at 835.  Other comments were more vituperative: “They ought to 
hang the s___ of a b___.”  Id.  See also Marquess v. State, 721 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986) (reporting that criminal defendant told judge: “I want no part of your kangaroo court. You can 
kangaroo me once you ain’t going to do it twice.”); State ex rel. Neb Bar Ass’n v. Rhodes, 131 
N.W.2d 118, 123 (Neb. 1964) (reporting an allegation of an attorney in a disciplinary 
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III.  HABITAT 
As I noted earlier, this article was inspired by Justice Levinson’s 
somewhat startling use of the phrase “Kafkaesque kangaroo court” to 
describe the board of trustees of the Castle Memorial Hospital.149  As it 
turns out, Justice Levinson is a rather rare bird; there are only about 
twenty published opinions in which a judge has declared another tribunal 
to be a kangaroo court.  This section examines those opinions, and while 
it is organized according to habitat – identifying the locations in which 
kangaroo decision-makers have been spotted – it also discusses the 
distinctive behaviors of the adjudicatory marsupial. 
A.  Joey Justice for Juvies 
In what has become the single most famous judicial accusation of 
kangaroo-ism, “Mr. Justice Fortus . . . [made] the thundering statement 
that ‘Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not 
justify a kangaroo court.’”150  In In re Gault,151 the opinion in which 
 
proceeding,“that Albert W. Crites was an imported ‘kanagroo judge,’ imported by the State of 
Nebraska through its agents . . . ‘to Kanagroo this respondent, and prevent this respondent from 
having a fair trial’”); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Reitzer, 135 S.W. 237, 241 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1911) (“[T]he insistence is that the indignities [the plaintiff] received from being kangarooed 
by the other prisoners naturally flowed from his wrongful imprisonment.”).  
 149. Silver v. Castle Mem’l Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 575 (Haw. 1972) (Levinson, J., concurring). 
 150. State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), vacated, Santana v. 
Texas, 397 U.S. 596 (1970) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967)).  One judge’s thunder, it 
would seem, is another judge’s diatribe.  See In re Billie, 436 P.2d 130, 136 (Ariz. 1968), overruled 
in part by State v. Martin, 489 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1971) (“The thrust of Gault appears clearly in the 
author’s diatribe against the failure of the juvenile justice system to achieve its high principles of 
treatment and rehabilitation . . .”).  And in DeBacker v. Brainard, Justice Carter of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court found Justice Fortas’s statement to be “an implied criticism of juvenile judges that is 
wholly unwarranted.”  161 N.W.2d 508, 516 (Neb. 1968) (Carter, J., dissenting).  Justice Carter 
went on to say: 
The Supreme Court of the United States appears to be pointing toward a declaration of 
the unconstitutionality of the beneficent provisions of most juvenile court statutes. . . . It 
appears to take the position that its wisdom in this area exceeds in quality all the judicial 
pronouncements before it in the field of juvenile delinquency.  The fact that a judge is a 
member of the highest court of the nation or state is not, of itself, proof of infallibility of 
decision.  It might be well for members of such courts, on occasion, to step down from 
their ivory towers and recall with some humility that they were at the time of their 
appointment better than average lawyers with little judicial experience, of which there 
are many, who knew a President or Governor. . . . When and if a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States holds the Juvenile Court Act of this state to be 
unconstitutional under the federal Constitution, I want to make it clear that I shall 
recognize the power of that court to do so under the doctrine of judicial supremacy, but 
with the reservation of the privilege to protest its right to do so.  But I shall neither bend 
the knee nor bow the head on mere inferences, speculations, or probabilities as to what 
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Justice Fortas thundered, the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court to affirm the dismissal of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the parents of a fifteen-year-
old boy who had been committed, by the Juvenile Court of Gila County, 
Arizona,152 to six years in the State Industrial School153 for an offense – 
“Lewd Phone Calls”154 – that would have earned an adult a sentence of 
“$5 to $50 [in fines], or imprisonment for not more than two months.”155 
Justice Fortas was moved to the point of thunder by the lack of due 
process afforded to Gerald Gault after he and a friend were picked up by 
the police for allegedly engaging in telephonic lewdness.156  First, the 
police gave Gerald’s family no notice that he had been picked up.157  
Second, neither the deputy probation officer prosecuting the case nor the 
juvenile court served Gerald’s family with a copy of the petition the 
probation officer filed with the court.158 Third, the petition itself was 
 
that court will eventually do. 
Id. at 518-19.  Among other things, Justice Carter objected to the majority’s interpretation of Gault 
as requiring that 
a juvenile charged with a violation of a state criminal law as the basis for an adjudication 
of delinquency is entitled to a constitutional right to a trial by jury in juvenile courts of 
the offense is one which would give rise to a constitutional right to a trial by jury if 
committed by an adult and triable in an adult criminal court. 
Id. at 513. 
 151. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  Justas Fortas’s opinion in Gault has proven to be a mother 
lode of bon môts for critics of the juvenile justice system.  In addition to the kangaroo court 
comment, there is this: 
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system 
for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context.  The constitutional and 
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is – to say the least – debatable.  And in 
practice, as we remarked in the Kent case . . . the results have not been entirely 
satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, 
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and 
procedure.  In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: “The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle 
in comparison with those of our juvenile courts * * *. 
Id. at 17-18 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Roscoe Pound, forward to YOUNG, 
SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY xxvii (1937)) (footnotes and other citations 
omitted).  Several subsequent opinions in the area of juvenile law have quoted both Dean Pound’s 
star chamber language and Justice Fortas’s kangaroo court comment.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Fulton 
v. Scheetz, 166 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Iowa 1969); In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 401, 402 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985); Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 793, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
 152. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. 
 153. Id. at 7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. at 4-5. 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158. Id. 
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entirely conclusory and contained no factual allegations.159 Fourth, at the 
hearing held the day after Gerald was picked up: “Mrs. Cook, the 
complainant, was not there.  No one was sworn at this hearing.  No 
transcript or recording was made.  No memorandum or record of the 
substance of the proceedings was prepared.”160  At a second hearing, 
held one week later, “a ‘referral report’ made by the probation officers 
was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his 
parents.”161  Moreover, in determining the proper disposition of Gerald’s 
case, the juvenile judge appears to have factored in a two-year-old 
referral, concerning Gerald’s alleged theft of a baseball glove, that 
resulted in no formal accusation and no hearing on the matter.162  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the process given Gerald was 
tainted by unconstitutional kangaroo-ism because: Gerald and his 
parents received inadequate notice of the charges against him;163 Gerald 
and his parents were not advised of Gerald’s right to counsel;164 and 
Gerald’s privilege against self-incrimination and his rights to 
confrontation and cross-examination were violated.165  The Court 
declined, however, to decide whether it was kangaroo-ism for the law of 
Arizona to deny juveniles a right to appeal, for the juvenile court not to 
record its proceedings, or for the juvenile court judge to fail to state 
grounds for his conclusions.166 
Justice Fortas’s stirring indictment of the Gila County Juvenile 
Court is, paws down, the most famous kangaroo court reference of all 
time; it has been quoted or paraphrased in no fewer than twenty 
subsequent judicial opinions from courts across the country, mostly in 
the area of juvenile justice,167 which is, by far, the most hospitable 
habitat I have found for marsupial decision-makers.  Judges have quoted 
Gault in decisions that have identified kangaroo-ism in the Superior 
Court of Coconino County, Arizona,168 the Juvenile Court and the Court 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 7. 
 162. Id. at 9. 
 163. Id. at 31-34. 
 164. Id. at 34-42. 
 165. Id. at 42-57. 
 166. Id. at 58. 
 167. In the one opinion outside the realm of juvenile law that paraphrases Justice Fortas, 
Justice Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court, writing in dissent, quoted John Junker, who said: 
“Under our Constitution . . . the condition of being a [petty offender] does not justify a kangaroo 
court.”  City of Seattle v. Guay, 76 P.3d 231, 239 (Wash. 2003) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quoting 
John M. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 (1968)). 
 168. See In re Billie, 429 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), vacated, 436 P.2d 130 (Ariz. 
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of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania,169 the Meeker 
County Court in Minnesota,170 the 252nd District Court, Jefferson 
County, Texas,171 the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of 
Hartford,172 and a majority opinion from the Arizona Supreme Court.173  
Gault has also been quoted in opinions determining that kangaroo-ism 
had not raised its ugly head in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court 
of Clay County, Missouri,174 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina,175 the District Court of Linn County, 
Iowa,176 the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, sitting 
 
1968) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus where juveniles were committed to State 
Industrial School after hearing at which they were not informed of right to counsel). 
 169. Commonwealth v. Sadler, 3 Phila. County Rptr. 316, 330 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979).  In Sadler, 
a fifteen-year-old was brought to trial, as an adult, eleven months after his arrest for an eight-dollar 
robbery.  Id. at 316-17.  In the words of Judge Forer, who granted the defendant’s petition to set 
aside his conviction: “As Mr. Justice Fortas trenchantly ruled, the fact of being a boy does not 
justify a kangaroo court. . . .  Nor does it justify a delay of eleven months in bringing a boy to trial.”  
Id. at 330. 
 170. See In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing order of 
institutional placement where juvenile court’s order was based upon insufficient evidence). 
 171. See Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (reversing court of 
appeals decision upholding trial court’s denial of motion to suppress fingerprint evidence when 
juvenile suspect was fingerprinted without probable cause). 
 172. See In re Steven M., 789 A.2d 1169, 1173-74 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002) (vacating trial 
court’s order transferring juvenile from department of children and families facility to department of 
corrections facility because trial court made no finding as to juvenile’s competency).  On appeal, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing was 
harmless error.  See In re Steven M., 826 A.2d 156, 169 (Conn. 2003). 
 173. See Gammons v. Berlat, 696 P.2d 700, 704 (Ariz. 1985) (Feldman, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  In Gammons, the majority held that Arizona’s statutory infancy defense to 
criminal charges was inapplicable in juvenile proceedings.  Id.  Justice Feldman disagreed: “‘Under 
our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.’  Nor should the 
condition of being a child justify the imposition of criminal sanctions absent proof that a crime was 
committed.”  Id.  (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 28).  
 174. Ex parte DeGrace, 425 S.W.2d 228, 232-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that notice of 
juvenile hearing that “specifically alleged the factual basis for the charge of . . . delinquency” and 
was served twenty-three days before delinquency hearing satisfied requirements of due process). 
 175. United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 445 (4th Cir. 1968) (affirming juvenile’s 
conviction for Dyer Act violation on grounds that defendant’s rights of confrontation and cross-
examination and his privilege against self-incrimination were not violated and that district court 
applied the correct standard of proof).  The court of appeals did note, however, that “[i]f we had to 
decide this case on the standard of proof issue tendered by the Government, we would be compelled 
to reverse, for the diluted measure proposed for juvenile cases is predicated upon a logic the 
cogency of which has been utterly devastated.”  Id. 
 176. State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Iowa 1969) (affirming district 
court’s adjudication of Scheetz as a “criminal sexual psychopath,” noting: “Gault and our case are 
in no way comparable.  There with no semblance of due process punishment was immeasurably 
enhanced.  None of the procedures condemned in Gault appears in our case.  The exact opposite 
appears.  Defendant has had the benefit of the most lenient of procedures and has already been 
paroled.”). 
31
Potter: Kangaroo Courts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
POTTER1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:16:14 AM 
104 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:73 
as a juvenile court,177 the District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, 
sitting as a juvenile court,178 and the Connecticut Superior Court for 
Juvenile Matters.179 
In In re Lang,180 Judge Elwyn of the Family Court of Ulster 
County, New York, quoted Gault to support his decision to apply, in a 
juvenile proceeding, a rule of criminal procedure “which prohibits the 
conviction of a defendant upon the testimony of an accomplice unless 
corroborated by other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the crime.”181  In other words, Judge Elwyn took 
affirmative action to keep his court from being fairly accused of 
kangaroo-ism by extending to a juvenile adjudication a rule of adult 
criminal procedure that was more favorable to the accused than the rule 
 
 177. In re Johnson, 255 A.2d 419, 423-24 (Md. 1969) (affirming juvenile court’s denial of a 
motion for a jury trial and holding that Gault does not require jury trials in juvenile proceedings). 
 178. State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Tex. 1969) (holding that “Gault does not require 
that the juvenile trial be adversary and criminal in nature . . . that the ‘beyond the reasonable doubt’ 
test is not required” and that “it was not error for the [trial] court to grant the State the leave to 
amend . . . while at the same time offering Santana an opportunity to postpone the trial to some later 
date if he so desired”).  In Santana, Justice Greenhill offered an excellent thumbnail precis of Gault: 
The Gault opinion recognized, or at least reserved judgment on, the policy of the 
juvenile court system.  It declined to announce that they were either criminal or civil 
courts, rather recognizing that they were sui generis.  It did make it plain that the system 
was being badly abused in some areas so that many children, not properly treated as 
juveniles, were not given the protection of adults, and got “the worst of both worlds.”  
And, on many occasions, instead of getting the kindly father approach from the judge, a 
child was often whisked away to the equivalent of a prison in what amounted to Star 
Chamber proceedings.  “His world becomes ‘a building of whitewashed walls, 
regimented routine and institutional laws * * *’  Instead of mother and father * * * his 
world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with 
him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.”  387 U.S. at 27.   
At the darkest point in this bleak picture masterfully painted by Mr. Justice Fortas is the 
thundering statement that “Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not 
justify a kangaroo court.” 
To correct the kangaroo court approach, the Gault opinion announced basic 
constitutional guarantees for juvenile proceedings, whether they be civil, criminal, or sui 
generis: adequate notice, right to counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Id. at 617. 
  Without citing Gault, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision in Santana.  
Santana v. Texas, 397 U.S. 596, 596 (1970) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) 
(holding that beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies “during the adjudicatory stage when a 
juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed as an adult”)). 
 179. See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 717-19 (Conn. 2001) (affirming trial court’s dismissal 
of State’s petition to extend commitment of juvenile, when juvenile was not advised, at the time of 
pleading nolo contendere, that a plea could result in extension of commitment). 
 180. In re Lang, 301 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969). 
 181. Id. at 139. 
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normally applied in juvenile proceedings.  Similarly, in In re Knox,182 
Judge Schwab of the Oregon Court of Appeals quoted the kangaroo 
court language from Gault183 and then went on to explain the court’s 
dismissal of the State’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of a juvenile 
petition, announcing: “We . . . hold that the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy applies in juvenile proceedings where a juvenile 
is charged with a criminal act and is therfore subjected to possible loss 
of liberty.”184  And in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,185 a 
case in which the trial court issued an order barring publication of the 
name and photograph of a juvenile who had been accused of a crime, 
Justice Hodges of the Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted Gault186 and 
then noted that the question before the court was “whether the condition 
of being a boy warrants extension of rights in excess of those granted by 
the Constitution to all citizens.”187  Ultimately, the court ruled that the 
trial judge’s order was permissible.188  The trial judge’s victory was 
short-lived; the Oklahoma Supreme Court was subsequently reversed by 
the United States Supreme Court.189 
 
 182. In re Knox, 532 P.2d 245 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). 
 183. Id. at 247. 
 184. Id. at 249. 
 185. Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, 555 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Okla. 1976) rev’d, 430 
U.S. 308 (1977). 
 186. Id. at 1291. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1293-94.  However, Justice Hodges also acknowledged the merits of the argument 
against confidentiality: 
The argument for freedom of the press to report juvenile proceedings is that the press is 
the watchdog of society and that if they are precluded by statute from reporting a matter 
of public interest, soon any judicial proceedings could be made subject to private 
proceedings, and a return to the star chamber would inure as the direct result of the 
denial of the press to unrestrainedly gather the news. 
Id. at 1292. 
 189. Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Ct., Okla. County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).  In San Bernardino 
County Department of Public Social Services v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991), another case about public access to juvenile proceedings, the court of appeals quoted Gault, 
id. at 341, and then noted: 
Public access may as well improve juvenile court practice and serve many, if not all of 
the societal values first recognized in the context of a criminal trial. 
At the jurisdictional hearing in both dependency and delinquency cases, the court is 
engaged in a fact-finding process in attempting to determine whether the minor comes 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  To the extent open proceedings discourage 
perjury and might encourage other witnesses to come forward which in turn leads to 
more accurate fact-finding, public access to juvenile proceedings is beneficial. 
Id.  In San Bernardino, the California Court of Appeal held that a newspaper had no constitutionally 
protected right to attend the juvenile dependency proceedings at issue, id. at 343, and went on to  
direct the juvenile court to vacate its order allowing press access primarily because 
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On the other hand, in an opinion in which she committed to the 
Warwick State Training School for Boys “a 13 year old boy who [was] a 
long-time school truant and beyond parental control in regard to his 
school attendance,”190 but who had committed no crimes or acts harmful 
to others,191 Judge Dembitz of the New York Family Court explained 
that “while ‘the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court,’ the condition of being a boy does entail dependence on the part of 
the child and a reciprocal responsibility on the part of adults.”192 
Finally, there is one opinion quoting Gault that all but defies 
classification.  In DeBacker v. Brainard,193 a four-judge majority of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the Nebraska Juvenile Court 
Act was unconstitutional because it did not provide for jury trials and 
employed a preponderance of the evidence standard.194  However, 
because the Nebraska constitution provides that “[n]o legislative act 
shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five 
judges,”195 the three-judge dissent carried the day, and the Juvenile 
Court Act was not struck down.196  Moreover, while the majority cited 
Gault, it was Justice Carter’s dissent that quoted Gault’s kangaroo court 
 
apparently a significant reason, if not the sole reason, the juvenile court decided to allow 
the [newspaper] to attend the proceedings was the court’s misguided belief that allowing 
the press admittance would somehow afford the court an avenue through which it could 
control the publicity surrounding [the] case.  
Id. at 344. 
 190. In re Mario, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1971). 
 191. Id. at 666. 
 192. Id. at 668.  Judge Dembitz’s embellishment of Justice Fortas’s proclamation in Gault was 
paraphrased by Judge Lupiano of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a dissent 
from a decision that reversed a decision of the Family Court to deny a motion to dismiss a petition 
for absconding from home brought by the State of New York against a sixteen-year-old 
Pennsylvania girl picked up at the Port Authority in New York City.  See In re Bonnie Michelle W., 
429 N.Y.S.2d 638, 647 (N.Y.A.D. 1980) (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (“‘while the condition of being a 
(young girl) does not justify a kangaroo court’ . . . the condition of being a (young girl) does entail 
dependence on the part of the child and a reciprocal responsibility on the part of adults”).  The 
majority had reversed the family court on jurisdictional grounds, because the girl’s father and step-
mother in Pennsylvania had failed to obtain a requisition as required by the Interstate Compact on 
Juveniles.  Id. at 638. 
 193. DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1968). 
 194. Id. at 508-09.  Notwithstanding the opinion of the DeBacker majority, the United States 
Supreme Court subsequently held that “trial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not 
a constitutional requirement.”  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 195. DeBacker, 161 N.W.2d at 509.  The juvenile appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
which noted probable jurisdiction, DeBacker v. Brainard, 393 U.S. 1076 (1969), but ultimately 
dismissed the appeal on grounds that none of the constitutional issues were properly presented for 
review, DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1969). 
 196. DeBacker, 161 N.W. 2d at 509. 
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language.197  The bottom line is that it is anybody’s guess whether the 
juvenile justice system in Nebraska qualifies as a kangaroo court. 
B.  Up and Down the Halls of Government 
Following the juvenile justice system, the most common habitat for 
adjudicative kangaroos is the executive branch of government. For 
example, in Dorsey v. Kingsland,198 the United States Patent Office 
issued an order disbarring Vernon Dorsey from practicing before it on 
grounds of gross misconduct, which order was affirmed by the district 
court.199  The court of appeals resoundingly reversed: 
Contrary to this salutary rule, the Patent Office in a desperate effort to 
alibi its confessed failure to perform its duty [to investigate Dorsey’s 
alleged wrongdoing itself rather than relying upon an article in a trade 
journal] waited more than eighteen years until the evidence had largely 
disappeared to bring stale charges against appellant, and then 
proceeded to try and convict him before a “kangaroo court.” We use 
the term “kangaroo court” advisedly because this so-called tribunal 
tried appellant on charges most of which were not even included in the 
notice to show cause and on which there is not a shred of evidence to 
connect him, convicted him on several of these charges and deprived a 
venerable man and respected lawyer of his means of livelihood. . . .   
The only justification assigned for disbarring appellant on a proceeding 
which included trial on many charges of which he had not been 
apprised and had not been afforded an opportunity to prepare his 
defense and as to which the evidence did not even remotely connect 
him, was that as a witness in his own behalf he did not assume the 
burden of proof and affirmatively disprove the allegations against him 
(of many of which he had not been notified) and that on some questions 
his memory was faulty in that he sometimes responded that he could 
not remember.  Mirabile dictu. 
. . . To say that a man approaching eighty should be disbarred because 
he could not remember some incident of a trial which took place 
twenty years before seems to us to be absur[d].200 
Moving from the realm of patents to that of alcoholic beverages, but 
staying with the federal government, the Third Circuit suggested, at least 
indirectly, that the Alcohol Tax Unit of the U.S. Department of the 
 
 197. Id. at 516, 518. 
 198. Dorsey v. Kingsland, 173 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 338 U.S. 318 (1949). 
 199. Id. at 406. 
 200. Id. at 407-08. 
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Treasury acted as a kangaroo court when it bypassed the procedures 
specified in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,201 and used those 
specified in the Federal Alcohol Administration Act,202 to sanction the 
Trenton Beverage Company for selling beer and whiskey “at prices 
above the maximum fixed under the Emergency Act.”203  Just before 
noting that “[t]he sanctions of the Emergency Act are entirely adequate 
for any violations of this measure,”204 the court observed that “quite 
germane here are the remarks of Congressman Wolcott on the so-called 
‘kangaroo courts.’”205 
While nearly half a dozen state prison disciplinary boards have 
prevailed against charges of kangaroo-ism leveled against them,206 at 
least one was not so fortunate.  In King v. Higgins,207 “an inmate in the 
farm section of M.C.I., Concord [Massachusetts]”208 was brought before 
the prison disciplinary board but “was not afforded prior notice of the 
hearing, nor advised of his right to seek the advice of counsel, to 
confront the complaining officer and present witnesses on his own 
behalf.”209  He was found guilty at the hearing, and filed an unsuccessful 
appeal with the prison superintendent, in which he “characteriz[ed] the 
disciplinary proceeding as a “Kangaroo Court.”210  A magistrate judge in 
the district court agreed with the prisoner, ruling “that the procedures 
employed at his disciplinary hearing denied [him] of due process of 
law.”211  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.212  In 
Gierbolini Colon v. Aponte Roque, 213 Judge Pieras smelled more than a 
whiff of kangaroo-ism in the actions of the general manager of the 
Puerto Rico Department of Education Radio and Television Service, 
who terminated the director of WIPR-AM & FM without giving him an 
opportunity, prior to his termination, to respond to the charges against 
him.214  In the words of Judge Pieras: 
 
 201. Trenton Beverage Co. v. Berkshire, 151 F.2d 227, 229 (3rd Cir. 1945) (citing 50 U.S.C.A. 
Appendix § 901 et seq.)). 
 202. 27 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. 
 203. Trenton Beverage Co., 151 F.2d at 228. 
 204. Id. at 229. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See section III.D, infra. 
 207. King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 208. Id. at 19. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 22. 
 213. Gierbolini Colon v. Aponte Roque, 666 F. Supp. 334 (D.P.R. 1987). 
 214. Id. at 338. 
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More important, the decision to terminate was not only mistaken, it 
was a sham. Gierbolini was deprived of property without due process 
of law precisely because the reasons given for his termination were 
false.  We need not tary with any post-termination procedure that may 
have been afforded Gierbolini; he was deprived of property with only 
kangaroo process.215 
The kangaroo’s range extends beyond the federal and state levels of 
government; interesting specimens have been spotted hopping down the 
halls of various municipal government agencies.  In Ciechon v. City of 
Chicago,216 a Chicago Fire Department paramedic sued the City of 
Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that she was terminated in 
violation of her rights to due process and equal protection.217  Her 
termination, after a hearing before the Personnel Board, resulted from 
pressure exerted by the family of a man who died shortly after refusing 
to be transported to the hospital by Ciechon and her ambulance crew.218  
Judge Cummings explained just how and why the Personnel Board was, 
in Ciechon’s case, a kangaroo court: 
The investigation of the charges against Ciechon was so incomplete 
and biased as to demonstrate clearly that the City made no effort to 
assess the incident fairly.  Rather, the City seemed bent from the outset 
upon limiting its investigation in order to justify discharging Ciechon.  
The most obvious evidence of this conduct is that paramedic Ritt, 
whose duties and responsibilities were identical to Ciechon’s, was 
never formally investigated and was only questioned about the incident 
in the most casual manner. The reports of Ritt and Altman [the 
ambulance driver], which supported Ciechon’s version of events, were 
virtually ignored by the investigators. Dziedzic [a candidate firefighter 
who also went on the call] was never interviewed nor asked to write a 
report.  None of the contemporaneous documentary evidence which 
supported Ciechon was sought by the investigators – neither the 
transcripts of the two telephone calls by the patient’s family seeking 
paramedic assistance nor the ambulance journal which recorded the 
call and its disposition.  Moreover, testimony presented by the City at 
the Personnel Board hearing illustrates the improper motives with 
which the City conducted these proceedings.  Dr. Mesnick was the 
primary witness against Ciechon.  His testimony consisted of the 
results of his perfunctory investigation, countless unwarranted 
presumptions, and his personal opinions as to Ciechon’s performance.  
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 217. Id. at 513, 516. 
 218. Id. at 520. 
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His own testimony betrays a considerable lack of thoroughness in his 
investigation: not only did he never question paramedic Ritt, but, for 
example, he never looked at Ciechon’s personnel file.  Most seriously, 
Mesnick’s medical opinions were based on a view of events under 
which he characterized the patient’s problems as “acute 
decompensation,” i.e., an obvious medical emergency requiring 
immediate stabilization.  Not even the family so characterized the 
patient’s condition on the first ambulance run.  Yet the hearing officer 
unqualifiedly credited Mesnick’s testimony on medical matters in 
dispute in this case.  Finally, neither the initial investigator, Ormond, 
nor the Fire Commissioner recommended discharge when the charges 
were made against Ciechon. Yet by the time of the hearing her 
discharge was not only sought, but, according to the family, was 
virtually assured. 
. . .  
The transgression of the due process clause becomes plainer upon 
consideration of the irregular administrative procedures employed.  
Although Section 25.1-6 of the Municipal Code requires that charges 
against a career civil service employee be brought “by proper 
authority,” most of these were brought instead by the Chicago 
Corporation Counsel’s staff, which also represented the trial agency, 
viz., the Personnel Board and all the defendants, including the initial 
charging party Albrecht – obviously a direct conflict in interest. . . . All 
these irregularities add up to a case slanted from the start against 
plaintiff, heard by a kangaroo court, and denying her due process.219 
In a frequently cited opinion, the California Supreme Court held that the 
assistant chief of the Fair Oaks Fire Protection District subjected 
Leonard Cole to a “kangaroo proceeding” to adjudicate a false charge of 
dishonesty, as part of a campaign to harass Cole for his activities as a 
union representative.220  And in an opinion that shows that prisoners are 
not the only people in prisons who are potentially vulnerable to 
kangaroo-ism, Justice Kass of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals 
explained, in an opinion in a racial discrimination case brought by an 
African-American prison guard, that “[t]he investigation into Brooks’s 
role in the incident of August 27, the commissioner [of the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination] found, was 
‘kangaroo justice’ directed to the object of firing Brooks, an end desired 
by Mark Kepple, deputy superintendent of the prison.”221 
 
 219. Id. at 520-22. 
 220. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 744, 745 (Cal. 1987) (en banc). 
 221. City of Boston v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination., 654 N.E.2d 944, 947 (Mass. 
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Kangaroos may also be found at school.  In Thompson v. Board of 
Education,222 a school librarian complained that she was denied 
“selected status,” and subsequently transferred “in retaliation for making 
remarks which were published in an article appearing in a weekly 
Chicago newspaper.”223  Ruling in the plaintiff’s favor after a bench 
trial, Judge Alesia observed, in response to the defendant’s argument 
that the plaintiff would have been denied “selected status” even if she 
had not participated in the newspaper article,  that “no one . . . could 
deny that Thompson’s interview panel, akin to a kangeroo [sic] court, 
viewed Thompson with a jaundiced eye . . . [and that] denial of ‘selected 
status’ was a foregone conclusion.”224 
In a majority opinion issued by an appellate court, identification of 
a tribunal as a kangaroo court is a stigma that carries the weight of law.  
While such an assertion in a dissenting opinion carries somewhat less 
weight, it must still sting.  In Marfork Coal Co. v. Callaghan,225 the 
West Virginia Supreme Court held that the procedural due process rights 
of the Marfork Coal Company were not violated when the state 
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) ordered Marfork to 
show cause why a mining permit should not be suspended or revoked 
and the director of DES presided over the show cause hearing.226  Justice 
Maynard dissented: 
I dissent in this case because I do not believe that Marfork Coal 
Company (“Marfork”) received a fair hearing.  Rather, it is clear to me 
that Marfork faced nothing less than a kangaroo court with Director 
Crum presiding. . . . His decision to suspend Marfork’s surface mining 
permit was a foregone conclusion before Marfork ever stepped into the 
hearing room.  Director Crum’s lack of impartiality and his 
prejudgment of this case is evident from his remarks in a press release 
issued prior to the hearing.  
. . .  
. . . Not only had Director Crum already made up his mind, he 
announced as much in the press release.  In effect, Crum was both the 
 
Ct. App. 1995).  Among other evidence for its finding of kangaroo-ism, the Commission noted that 
Brooks’s termination was based upon conduct for which white officers were not disciplined, id., and 
that deputy superintendent “Kepple had voiced hostility to African-American correction officers; by 
way of raw example, Kepple had said on one occasion, ‘fuck  the niggers.’”  Id. 
 222. Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 711 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 223. Id. at 396. 
 224. Id. at 410. 
 225. Marfolk Coal Co. v. Callaghan, 601 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 2004). 
 226. Id. at 58, 60-61. 
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prosecutor and the judge in this Star Chamber proceeding.  
 . . .   
. . . The actions of Director Crum in this case are similar to a circuit 
judge making comments regarding an accused murderer two weeks 
before he sits as the accused’s trial judge. . . . 
In my opinion, this case actually belongs in the annals of bad cases 
with unfair judges and bad results.  It goes somewhere on the list of 
really bad trials, a few of which follow as examples.  The trial of Susan 
B. Anthony for being a woman and voting, where Judge Ward Hunt 
barred her from testifying and directed a jury to find her guilty, which 
of course they did.  Or the trial of Galileo for heresy for correctly 
teaching that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the solar system 
and the earth and other planets merely revolved around it. . . . 
This list could go on forever but I will close it with only one more 
example, the famous “monkey” trial of John Scopes who was 
convicted of teaching evolution down in Tennessee.  When Judge 
John Raulston was clearly being one-sided in favor of the prosecutor 
during trial one day, Clarence Darrow began saying very provocative 
things in court about bias and unfairness, which rattled the learned 
jurist Judge Raultston.  “I hope,” said the Judge nervously, “that 
counsel intends no reflection upon this Court!”  Whereupon Darrow 
replied: “Your honor,” he said, “is always entitled to hope!”227 
 
In St. Johns County v. Smith,228 the trial court ordered the County 
Commission of St. Johns County (Florida) to grant an application for a 
modification of a planned unit development to allow a solid waste 
transfer facility as a permitted use.229  On certiorari review, the Florida 
District Court of Appeal quashed the order,230 because, inter alia, the 
trial court “substituted its evaluation of the evidence for that of the 
Commission’s and in so doing, departed from the essential requirements 
of law.”231  Justice Harris dissented, noting: 
In determining the County’s real reason for turning down the 
application, the trial judge was required to determine whether the 
expressed concern was a legitimate reaction to a fair and impartial 
hearing or whether he was observing crocodile tears from a kangaroo 
 
 227. Id. at 67-69. 
 228. St. Johns County v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 229. Id. at 1098. 
 230. Id. at 1100. 
 231. Id. 
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court.  The judge’s order makes clear what he determined.232 
Justice Harris is, to my knowledge, the only American jurist to have 
expressed an opinion on the ability of kangaroos to shed crocodile 
tears.233  Regrettably, the opinion is silent as to the ability of crocodiles 
 
 232. Id. at 1101 n.2 (Harris, J., dissenting). 
 233. “Crocodile tears,” however, is a relatively common metaphor in judicial opinions, judging 
by the number of hits – fifty-eight – on the term “crocodile tears” in the Westlaw ALLCASES 
database. Search was completed on October 25, 2005. 
  Regarding the meaning of the metaphor, “the phrase ‘crocodile tears’ means hypocritical 
sorrow or false or affected tears, deriving from an ancient belief that crocodiles shed tears over their 
victims and make moaning sounds to attract their prey.”  Gardner v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. Rptr. 
78, 80-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1968)). 
  Most often, crocodile tears flow into judicial opinions when the judge paraphrases or 
quotes a litigant.  For example, Judge Rakoff began his opinion in Nader v. ABC Television, Inc. in 
the following way: 
The on- and off-stage melodrama of “All My Children” may make for successful soap 
opera, but as a lawsuit it’s a bust.  In the instant case, Michael Nader, who once played 
the now-liquidated character of “Dimitri Marick,” expresses shock and dismay that 
ABC, after crying crocodile tears at his second criminal arrest, went ahead and fired him 
anyway.  But his angst does not translate into any legal claim that can survive summary 
judgment. 
Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  See also Mitchell v. 
Ward, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1237-38 (W.D. Okla. 1999) (quoting prosecutor’s closing argument: 
“He came in this courtroom, took an oath to tell the truth, looked you all straight in the face, and 
told you another story.  It was another story that you found by your verdict was not the truth.  He set 
up there and cried crocodile tears for Elaine but it was based on a lie and that’s what you folks told 
him by your verdict.”); State v. Ewing, No. 01C01-9612-CR-00531, 1998 WL 321932, at *10 
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 1998) (“[Defendant] also asserts that the prosecutor displayed 
‘crocodile tears’ to inflame the jury.”). 
  On the other hand, judges have sometimes used the phrase themselves to characterize a 
litigant.  See, e.g., In re Lakiya S., 636 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (N.Y.A.D. 1995) (remanding to the Family 
Court, for a new hearing before a different judge, in part because “the Family Court exhibited 
hostility toward the mother by charging her with ‘crying crocodile tears’ over her children’s sexual 
abuse”). 
  Perhaps the most remarkable judicial invocation of the metaphor of crocodile tears came 
from the pen of Justice Peck of the Vermont Supreme Court, in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Kirchoff: 
The medical profession has, in recent years, stressed preventative medicine equally with 
the curative.  The courts should take heed of this in criminal matters and develop their 
potential for preventive law.  One step might well be to serve notice that, in those cases 
where guilt, per se, is a fact, as distinguished from an evidentiary question, technicalities 
will be enforced, but with reluctance and with concern for the people who will be the 
future victims.  As it is now, too often, judicial opinions with the authoring pens dipped 
in the crocodile tears of activist judges, constitute “A Criminal’s Vade Mecum, or How 
to Commit Crime and Get Away With It.” 
Today’s decision stands as evidence that this Court is preoccupied, particularly in 
criminal cases, with the favorite diversion of too many state appellate courts, the sport of 
hunting for a constitutional baby behind every bush, waiting for the courts to come 
along, arm in arm with the whining wrongdoers who have been detected in flagrante 
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to shed kangaroo tears. 
C.  The Court Down Under and Collateral Damage 
As the opinions discussed in this section demonstrate, judicial-
branch kangaroos, while most plentiful in the juvenile justice system, 
may also be found in other kinds of courts.  In Smith v. Chicago School 
Reform Board of Trustees,234 the defendant appealed a $2 million jury 
verdict awarded to Carrie-Merle Smith, in the Northern District of 
Illinois, on her claims of racial discrimination and emotional distress.  
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded,235 and writing for a 
unanimous panel, Judge Easterbrook pulled no punches: 
According to the final pretrial order that governed the trial of this case, 
the parties agreed that Carrie-Merle Smith, a teacher at Collins High 
School in Chicago, was the victim of racial discrimination. . . . The 
jury was told that the parties agreed that “[a] racially hostile 
atmosphere existed at Collins H.S.” and that “the intimidation and 
racial harassment at Collins H.S. was unbearable” to Smith. . . . 
Emphasizing the extent to which the school system accepts Smith’s 
version of events, her lawyer hammered away during closing argument 
on the fact that the school system had called no witnesses of its own 
and barely questioned the testimony of hers. . . . 
What the jury heard was a sham. . . . [T]he persons Smith accused of 
vexing her denied the allegations under oath in depositions[.] . . .  Most 
of the events that were narrated occurred well outside the statute of 
limitations.  But the jury knew none of this – in part because the 
district judge held the school system to a pretrial order that Smith’s 
lawyer drafted, and in part because the judge informed the school 
system that it could call witnesses only with the plaintiff’s consent. 
Needless to say, consent was withheld.  The result was a kangaroo 
court, different only in the trappings from a default judgment.236 
 
delicto, and find them. 
State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988, 1007 (Vt. 1991) (Peck, J., dissenting). 
 234. Smith v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 165 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 235. Id. at 1151. 
 236. Id. at 1144.  According to the court of appeals: “The [trial court’s] legal error is subtle but 
important.  The district judge permitted plaintiff’s counsel to file her dream version of a pretrial 
order after concluding that defendant failed to meet a deadline for submitting its own version.”  Id. 
at 1144-45. Smith reports the third verified sighting of a kangaroo adjudicator in Chicago. See id. 
Unfortunately, my research offers no clue as to why Chi-town is such a hospitable habitat for 
kangaroos, but perhaps it is relevant to note that Melbourne, Australia’s own Luc Longley spent his 
most productive years as an NBA player in a Chicago Bulls uniform. 
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Justice Prentice of the Indiana Supreme Court was nearly as blunt in his 
characterization of the way in which the arrest and charging of William 
Robinson was handled: “We agree with the defendant that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the issuance of the arrest warrant 
without a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached 
magistrate and again, as charged by him, by holding a ‘kangaroo’ 
preliminary hearing at which his rights were totally disregarded.”237 
Judge Easterbrook and Justice Prentice are the only appellate 
judges I have found who went so far as suggest that the court below was 
actually a court down under. 
Two other judges, however, have gone nearly as far, by suggesting 
that another court, in a collateral proceeding, committed kangaroo-ism.  
In Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court,238 which involved the 
plaintiff’s futile attempt to have the Crow Tribal Court enforce a 
judgment it had received from the United States District Court on a 
claim that Daniel C. Old Elk Sr. had defaulted on a promissory note 
(secured by a purchase-money security interest in a forklift),239 Judge 
Battin delivered a blistering critique of the Crow Tribal Court: 
The Crow Tribal Court, acting as a sort of “kangaroo court,” has made 
no pretense of due process or judicial integrity.  Plaintiff was met not 
only with bias and uncooperativeness, but with a blatantly arbitrary 
denial of any semblance of due process. . . . 
It would appear that the Crow Tribal government changes judges at a 
whim, to the detriment of non-Indian litigants, and of the Tribe.  As a 
result, the Tribal Court lacks any continuity and uniform precedent 
which is the foundation of our judicial system.  While the tribal 
members enjoy the protection of their rights under both the United 
States Constitution and the ICRA [Indian Civil Rights Act], depending 
on the forum, it appears that non-Indians are not granted the same 
privilege of dual citizenship in Tribal Court.  If the Crow Tribe wishes 
to earn the respect and cooperation of its non-Indian neighbors, it must 
 
 237. Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ind. 1973).  The constitutional rights that were 
violated were Robinson’s “right to counsel at his preliminary hearing and the right of an effective 
preliminary hearing, with the right to call witnesses and to cross examine the state’s witnesses.”  Id.  
Because the court held that pre-trial kangaroo-ism to be harmless, id, it did not warrant reversing 
Robinson’s conviction.  Id.  However, Robinson did win a new trial, based upon another, non-
marsupial, trial error: taking the jury on a view of the crime scene over the objection of the 
defendant.  Id. at 412-23. 
 238. Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mont. 1988), vacated, 
708 F. Supp 1561 (D. Mont. 1989). 
 239. Id. at 920-921. 
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do more to engender that respect and cooperation, not abuse those 
neighbors who attempt to work within its system.240 
In re Middlebrooks241 involved a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in which the petitioner alleged “that he was illegally held in 
custody by the Sheriff of Santa Barbara County, California, for 
extradition to the State of Georgia to there serve out the balance of a 
sentence imposed by a State Court in Georgia.”242  In an order granting 
the petition, Judge Carter of the Southern District of California found 
that, in the state of Georgia, the petitioner “was not afforded a trial or an 
arraignment, but instead was brought before the Judge and sentenced 
without having entered a plea of guilty, or without a trial having 
occurred.”243  After framing the relevant question presented, “[w]as the 
sentence without plea and trial, namely the kangaroo court, a deprivation 
of due process of law?”,244 Judge Carter ruled that “there was obviously 
a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment where the state 
court sentenced in the absence of a plea of guilty or a trial and finding of 
guilt.”245 
 
 240. Id. at 923-24 (citations omitted).  The incidents of kangaroo-ism to which Judge Battin 
referred include the following: 
At the conclusion of the hearing [on the plaintiff’s complaint for Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgment], Tribal Judge Rowena Gets Down advised counsel for the plaintiff that the 
Court would issue its ruling in five working days.  Plaintiff Little Horn State Bank also 
submitted to the Court proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Foreclosure.  Although this hearing transpired more than two years ago, no decision has 
been issued by the Crow Tribal Court. 
Since the default hearing concluded, plaintiff’s counsel has made numerous inquiries 
about the status of said case.  Throughout all her communication with the Crow Tribal 
Court, plaintiff has only been advised that Tribal Judge Rowena Gets Down is no longer 
sitting on the bench and that a decision as to the underlying default is still pending. 
 . . . 
Having been advised of [the defendant’s] ex parte communication with [the state District 
Court] Judge Baugh, plaintiff’s counsel travelled to Crow Agency, Montana, where she 
spoke with Chief Judge Dennis Big Hair of the Crow Tribal Court. . . .  Judge Big Hair 
advised plaintiff’s counsel that no hearing would be scheduled and that no motion would 
be accepted by the Crow Tribal Court from Little Horn State Bank.  Judge Big Hair 
further advised counsel that the Crow Tribal Appellate Court was a nonfunctioning body, 
but that the Appellate Court might begin hearing cases at Judge Big Hair’s request. 
Id. at 920-21. 
 241. In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev’d, Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 
F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 242. Id. at 945. 
 243. Id. at 948. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 950. 
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D.  In the Private Sector 
Many of America’s kangaroo decision-makers have been spotted 
doling out marsupial justice within the executive and judicial branches 
of government, but antipodal adjudicators are a hardy, adaptable breed, 
and their range extends into the private sector. 
In Brevetti v. Tzougros,246 the plaintiff was granted an injunction 
barring her removal as a director of the Queensboro (New York) 
Federation of Parents’ Clubs, Inc.,247 based upon Judge Tessler’s finding 
that her “dismissal, accomplished without notice of any kind or the right 
of confrontation, is offensive and contrary to our fundamental processes 
of democratic and legal procedure, fair play, and spirit of the law.”248  In 
the judge’s view, “[i]t appear[ed] that the plaintiff was removed from 
office and membership by what amounts to a ‘kangaroo court.’”249  
Randolph v. Spruce Cabin Camping Ass’n250 involved Hampton 
Randolph’s expulsion from the Spruce Cabin Camping Association for 
inactivity.251  Judge Thomson agreed with Randolph “that his expulsion 
violated the provisions of the Nonprofit Corporation Law, 15 Pa.C.S.A. 
§ 7767.”252  In the words of Judge Thomson: 
 
We feel this section of the law requires basic due process proceeding, 
although not perhaps with all the formality which a day in court of 
record might entail.  At any rate, the notice given Mr. Randolph was 
clearly deficient in that it did not inform him of any charge or basis to 
expel him, or that such action was contemplated.253   
 
As it turns out, the Spruce Cabin campers are not the only recreationists 
who have learned, in court, that their rustic retreat was infested with 
kangaroos.  In Humphrey v. Northwestern Connecticut Sportsman Ass’n, 
Inc.,254 Frederick Humphrey challenged the suspension of his 
membership in the Sportsman Association.255  Humphrey’s membership 
 
 246. Brevetti v. Tzougros, 247 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). 
 247. Id. at 296. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 297. 
 250. Randolph v. Spruce Cabin Camping Ass’n, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 71 (Ct. Com. Pl., Monroe 
County 1979). 
 251. Id. at 72-73. 
 252. Id. at 73-74. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Humphrey v. Nw. Conn. Sportsman Ass’n, Inc., No. CV020087895S, 2002 WL 31045973 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2002). 
 255. Id. at *1. 
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was suspended by the Association’s Executive Committee on grounds 
that he had behaved intemperately toward a fellow member who was 
filleting a bird in a manner that Humphrey felt to be unsanitary and 
harmful to the environment.256  At the Executive Committee meeting at 
which Humphrey was expelled, he was not allowed to present witnesses 
and was denied the opportunity to be represented by counsel.257  
Believing that such a hearing would be “inherently unfair,”258 Humphrey 
chose not to attend,259 and subsequently, he “did not avail himself of the 
right to appeal which is permitted by Article IX, D of the [Association’s] 
bylaws . . . because, in his words, it’s a ‘kangaroo court.’”260 Judge 
Walsh agreed: “[t]he plaintiff was justified in believing that based upon 
the unreasonable ground rules established for the hearing itself, an 
appeal from the results of that unfair hearing, based upon a reading of 
the minutes of the hearing appealed from, would suffer from the same 
inherent unfairness.”261  Humphrey is one of those rare cases in which a 
party making a charge of kangaroo-ism has been able to make the charge 
stick without having gone through the hearing he or she claims to be 
unfair. 
In Nelson v. Johnson,262 Judge Larson called out a labor union, the 
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, for 
kangaroo-ism directed toward several of its members.  In Nelson, the 
officers of Local 386 charged approximately a dozen members of the 
Local with being communists263 and tried them on those charges.264 
The first three union members tried were tried in accordance with the 
trial procedures set forth in the Union Constitution and they were 
acquitted. Thereafter the Trial Board changed the trial procedures; the 
accused were denied the right to have another accused union member 
act either as counsel or as witness and were presumed to be guilty 
instead of innocent of the charges, all in violation of the Union 
Constitution. . . . The Trial Board had secretly met with the charging 
party, Carlson, before the trials to consider his evidence and resolved 
that a constant vigil of the charged union members should be had 
pending trial.  Respondents further admitted in engaging in 
 
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. at *4. 
 258. Id. at *3. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at *4. 
 262. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1963). 
 263. Id. at 237. 
 264. Id. 
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surveillance of Petitioner Nelson’s house earlier in the year, 
accompanied by the charging party, Carlson, his two assistant business 
agents (members of the Trial Board) and others.265 
To make a long (but interesting) story short, union members found 
guilty by the Trial Board sued the union in federal court266 and achieved 
a settlement by which the Trial Board verdicts were set aside and 
withdrawn.267  Subsequently, the membership of the Local voted to pay 
the legal bills incurred by the members who had challenged the actions 
of the Trial Board,268 and the leadership of the Local, eventually backed 
by the International Union, steadfastly and successfully resisted doing 
so.269  In particular, the General Executive Board (GEB) of the 
International Union, in a letter dated November 15, 1961, urged the 
Local to reconsider its decision because: “(1) the International Union is 
against the general policy of the Brotherhood to sanction expenditure of 
local union funds for such purposes and, (2) the expenditure of such 
funds for such purposes might well constitute a violation of Title V of 
the Landrum-Griffin Act.”270  In his order granting judgment to the 
union members, in a suit brought under the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, Judge Larson observed: 
These Petitioners have already been through one Kangaroo court in 
this union.  That injustice was not corrected by the GEB. That letter of 
November 15, 1961, suggests to the Petitioners that the GEB is 
inalterably on the side of the Respondents.  Without hearing the case of 
the Petitioners, the GEB has again assisted the cause of the 
Respondents.  This letter not only deprived the Petitioners of 
reimbursement for their legal expenses for the first Federal trials; it 
suggested that if more kangaroo courts were forthcoming, there would 
be no help from the GEB.  This would in turn cause the Petitioners, 
men of modest means, to have to again seek the aid of the Federal 
courts.  This is the way that freedom of speech in the union hall is 
snuffed out; this is the way that tyranny begins  As the House 
Committee report said, H.Rep.No.741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959): 
The power and control of the affairs of a trade union by 
leaders who abuse their power and forsake their 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 238. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 238-40. 
 270. Id. at 239-40. 
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responsibilities inevitably leads to the elimination of efficient, 
honest and democratic practices within such union, and often 
results in irresponsible actions which are detrimental to the 
public interest.271 
Judge Larson further explained that “[t]he democratic process must 
determine the outcome of the union dispute – not the iron hand, the 
kangaroo court or the veiled threat.”272 
IV.  UNVERIFIED SIGHTINGS 
 Counterbalancing the twenty verified sightings of adjudicatory 
kangaroos discussed in the previous section are more than twice as many 
unverified sightings, described in opinions in which a judge has rejected 
a litigant’s claim of kangaroo-ism, thus cleansing the accused tribunal of 
any potential marsupial taint.  Like the previous section, this one is 
organized on the basis of habitat, and in the same way that the previous 
section pointed out the decision-making behaviors that inspired a writing 
judge to declare another tribunal to be a kangaroo court, this section 
identifies those behaviors that spared various accused decision makers 
from being forced to wear the Scarlet K. 
A.  Across the Pond 
The most famous defense of another tribunal – or at least the most 
frequently cited – originated in British Midland Airways Ltd. v. 
International Travel, Inc.273  In that case, brought to enforce a British 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim that it was 
denied due process in the British courts: “United States courts which 
have inherited major portions of their judicial traditions and procedure 
from the United Kingdom are hardly in a position to call the Queen’s 
Bench a kangaroo court.”274  Similarly, in In re Sindona,275 Judge Griesa 
 
 271. Id. at 269-70 (emphasis added). 
 272. Id. at 279.  One must presume that Judge Larson would be especially wary of a kangaroo 
with an iron hand wearing a veil.  
 273. British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 274. Id. at 871.  As Judge Burns noted, “It has long been the law that unless a foreign country’s 
judgments are the result of outrageous departures from our own [n]otions of ‘civilized 
jurisprudence,’ comity should not be refused.”  Id.  The principal beneficiary of Judge Burns’s well-
turned phrase would appear to be Lloyd’s of London.  See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 
1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting British Midland Airways, 497 F.2d at 871); Society of Lloyd’s 
v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Society of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 
632, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (same); Society of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476). 
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of the Southern District of New York granted a request for extradition 
based, in part, on his conclusion that:  
There [was] no indication in the material submitted by Sindona that the 
Republic of Italy subjects accused persons to anything approaching 
summary proceedings or ‘kangaroo courts,’ which occur in nations 
which disregard human rights [and that] Italy has a criminal justice 
system which comports with standards of the civilized world.276  
Regrettably, at least for the purposes of this article, no U.S. judge has 
ever been asked to determine whether a tribunal from Australia has acted 
as a kangaroo court. 
B.  Down Below 
Given the number of litigants who have told a trial judge, to his or 
her face, that he or she was presiding over a kangaroo court,277 it is 
hardly surprising that no small number of appeals have included 
accusations of kangaroo-ism directed toward the lower court that issued 
the decision being appealed.  Unremarkably, appellate courts have 
generally disagreed. 
In Cassidy v. Cassidy,278 a suit between two brothers over the 
distribution of their late father’s estate, Timothy Cassidy filed a motion 
in the San Joaquin County Superior Court, Probate Department, to 
declare his brother Patrick a vexatious litigant.279  Unhappy when that 
court did so, Patrick contended on appeal that “the judgment entered by 
the trial court [was] ‘completely insane’ and a ‘phantom judgment.’”280  
The court of appeals found “no lunacy or invisibility in the [trial] court’s 
pronouncement,”281 and also found “no evidence of the ‘Kangaroo Court 
proceedings’ Patrick claim[ed] taint[ed] the record.”282 
Cook v. McCarron283 involved an objection by a member of a 
plaintiff class to the findings of fact made by a special master which 
supported the settlement of a case against a labor union and its health 
and welfare fund.284  Judge Manning, of the Northern District of Illinois, 
 
 275. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 276. Id. at 695. 
 277. See Potter, supra note 9. 
 278. Cassidy v. Cassidy, No. C041972, 2003 WL 22311315 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2003). 
 279. Id. at *1. 
 280. Id. at *4. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Cook v. McCarron, Nos. 92 C 7042, 95 C 0828, 1997 WL 47448 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1997). 
 284. Id. at *11. 
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characterized Robert McGinnis’s objections as follows:  
 
As earnestly as we try, it is very difficult to decipher the exact theories 
McGinnis asserts, i.e. ‘[T]his is not fair . . .’, ‘Special Master Frank J. 
McGarr appears to be trying to discredit anyone who factually opposes 
his views and stands up for their rights,’ or ‘Almost all of the class 
members are aware of kangaroo court hearings.’285   
 
Judge Manning saw things differently: “This court instead concludes 
that Special Master McGarr should be commended for a record which 
reveals the patience, accommodation and evenhanded approach accorded 
Mr. McGinnis.”286 
In State v. Roberson,287 the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a 
criminal defendant’s argument that the Summit County Court of 
Common Pleas, in which he was convicted, was “nothing more than a 
‘kangaroo court’”288 because his indictment failed to allege the city or 
town in which his crime was supposed to have taken place, thus 
depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.289  Kelley-El v. 
Parke290 is another criminal case with a jurisdictional twist.  In his 
second petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, 
“Kelley-El claimed that the ‘Indiana courts are engaged in an ongoing 
conspiracy’ to keep him in ‘judicial slavery’ through the use of 
‘kangaroo courts.’”291  His charge of kangaroo-ism was based upon his 
legal theory that “the Indiana courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
try him [for possessing a stolen vehicle] because the stolen vehicle he 
was caught driving was stolen in Illinois.”292  After affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of Kelley-El’s petition on procedural grounds – failure 
to raise the jurisdictional claim in his first petition293 – the court of 
 
 285. Id. at *12. 
 286. Id. 
 287. State v. Roberson, No. 18224, 1997 WL 549592 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1997). 
 288. Id. at *1. 
 289. Id.  In the opinion of the court of appeals, “[a]verment of the county and state in which the 
offenses occurred is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court.”  Id. at *2. As it turns out, 
however, the appellate court’s vindication of the trial court was merely dictum; before reaching the 
merits of the defendant’s argument, the court ruled that he had waived his objection to alleged 
defects in the indictment by failing to raise it on direct appeal.  Id. 
 290. Kelley-El v. Parke, 89 F.3d 838 (unpublished table decision), No. 95-2561, 95-2621, 1996 
WL 359755 (7th Cir. June 25, 1996). 
 291. Id. at *1. 
 292. Id. at *2. 
 293. Id. 
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appeals went on to observe that Kelley-El’s jurisdictional argument was 
legally incorrect.294  In yet another twist on jurisdiction, a criminal 
defendant argued, on appeal, in State v. Hunter,295 that the failure of the 
Butler County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas to “provide [him] with a 
copy of the law governing the jurisdiction of the arresting officer . . . 
resulted in a kangaroo court reminiscent of the Dark Ages.”296  The Ohio 
Court of Appeals found nothing unenlightened in Hunger’s conviction, 
noting in a per curiam opinion, that  
 
neither the trial court judge nor the prosecutor is under any obligation 
to provide the defendant with this information [and that] [t]he 
defendant had a right to ask his counsel, who was serving in an 
advisory capacity, to research this question but no right to request this 
information from the trial court.297 
 
In State v. French,298 a defendant convicted of various traffic 
offenses in the Hawai’i District Court, Third Circuit, contended, on 
appeal, that his trial took place in a kangaroo court.299  The state court of 
appeals construed the defendant’s kangaroo-court reference as a claim 
that he had been denied a fair trial,300 and then ruled that the record 
disclosed no unfairness resulting from either the defendant’s self-
representation301 or his alleged deafness.302  The court concluded that 
any error the court may have made regarding either self-representation 
or the defendant’s hearing impairment was harmless error because the 
defendant never denied committing any of the six violations he had been 
charged with.303  People v. Tuler304 was an appeal from the denial of a 
petition for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who had “entered 
 
 294. Id. 
 295. State v. Hunter, No. CA82-06-0068, 1983 WL 4432 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 1983). 
 296. Id. at *3. 
 297. Id. at *5.  The defendant in Hunter was convicted of defacing a highway overpass with 
spray paint, id. at *1, and apparently objected to being arrested by “an Ohio State Highway Patrol 
trooper . . . who, at the time of defendant’s arrest, was working under a Federal grant traffic control 
program.” Id. at *5.  In response to that argument, the court of appeals explained that “there is 
nothing to prevent an officer of the law, while on duty, regardless of his assignment, to interrupt that 
work in order to make a lawful arrest.”  Id. 
 298. State v. French, 883 P.2d 644 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994). 
 299. Id. at 649. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 650.  The only possible kangaroo in this case would appear to be the defendant 
himself. 
 304. People v. Tuler, 630 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994). 
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a blind plea of guilty to residential burglary in exchange for the 
dismissal of charges of aggravated battery and armed robbery.”305  In 
affirming the denial of Tuler’s petition by the Tenth Judicial Circuit 
Court, Peoria County, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected his charge 
of kangaroo-ism,306 explaining that: (1) the trial record plainly refuted 
Tuler’s claim that the trial court had failed to hold an evidentiary 
hearing;307 and (2) once Tuler had told the trial court he was prepared to 
proceed, neither the court nor Tuler’s standby council was under any 
obligation to inquire further into his preparedness to go forward with the 
hearing.308   
Fiorella v. State309 involved a criminal defendant’s claim that the 
judge who revoked his probation had predetermined his guilt before 
hearing all the evidence against him.310  According to the court: 
The most insistent argument pressed upon us, both in brief and upon 
our hearing of this appeal, arises from the fact that the trial judge, after 
making an oral statement, proceeded to read from a prepared written 
statement.  It is argued that the afternoon session commenced at 1:32, 
P.M., and thereafter testimony was taken, and the record fails to show 
any recess from then until the end of the hearing.  Hence, “the Court 
could not have known at the time of the preparation of the written 
statement that all the evidence was before the Court.”311 
The court rejected that argument, declining to “ascribe prejudgment to 
merely being prepared,”312 deeming it “highly proper for a judge, in 
circumstances such as those here, to set forth his reasons for a 
decision . . . [which] serve[s] a very useful purpose in educating the 
public in the workings of the probation system,”313 and declaring that 
“the mere fact that the court was prompt in deciding cannot be 
considered an element of bias and prejudice.”314  Finally, the court 
framed the legal context of the trial court’s decision in the following 
way: 
 
 305. Id. at 1288. 
 306. Id. at 1289.  According to the court of appeals, Tuler “characterize[d] the proceedings 
below as ‘Kangaroo Court’ proceedings which ‘resembled something from the Court of Star 
Chamber.’” Id. at 1288. 
 307. Id. at 1288-89. 
 308. Id. at 1289. 
 309. Fiorella v. State, 121 So. 2d 875 (Ala. Ct. App. 1960). 
 310. Id. at 878. 
 311. Id. at 879. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 880. 
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Certainly, when the amendment to the Constitution (No. XXXVIII) 
confers upon the Legislature authority to empower the courts of 
criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence, it is contemplated that the 
courts will not operate in a kangaroo fashion, but will arrive at their 
decisions in accordance with the best tradition of common law, which 
means, of course, that the defendant is entitled to all of those elements 
of consideration which we lump under the expression “fair play.”315 
By affirming the trial court’s decision to revoke Fiorella’s probation, the 
court of appeals sent the clear message that Fiorella had been given a 
pouch full of fair play rather than a dose of kangaroo-ism. 
In Kalejs v. INS,316 an alleged Nazi collaborator challenged a 
deportation order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals.317  On 
appeal, Kalejs argued that the court of appeals should “scrap most of the 
evidence against him because it [was] inherently unreliable.”318  While 
acknowledging that “the stakes of deportation hearings are great in terms 
of reputations and disruptions to lives”319 and recognizing its duty to 
“ensure that such proceedings do not turn into kangaroo courts,”320 the 
court held that “the hearings in this case were conducted with eminent 
fairness to Kalejs.”321  In so ruling, the court observed that “there is no 
general right of discovery in a deportation hearing so long as the accused 
had reasonable opportunity for cross-examination, as there was here,”322 
and explained, by implication, that the mere fact that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not apply to deportation hearings is not enough to 
make those hearings antipodally unfair.323 
In a case from the realm of military justice, the U.S. Navy-Marine 
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals was presented, in United States v. 
Davis,324 with an issue of first impression, namely: “whether, in 
exchange for a sentence limitation in a pretrial agreement, an accused 
can plead not guilty, enter into a confessional stipulation, and waive his 
right to present evidence on the merits.”325  After holding that the 
process was “unusual . . . [but] not inconsistent with due process under 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 317. Id. at 442. 
 318. Id. at 447. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. United States v. Davis, 46 M.J. 551 (N.-M. Crim. App. 1997). 
 325. Id. at 552. 
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the facts of this case,”326 the court of appeals detailed the military 
judge’s “comprehensive on-the-record review,”327 which included a 
Bertelson inquiry,328 and concluded that “[t]his was no ‘kangaroo 
court.’”329  
Gosa v. Mayden330 presented the United States Supreme Court with 
the question of whether to give retroactive effect to its decision in 
O’Callahan v. Parker331 that a member of the armed forces could not be 
tried in a court-martial for a crime that was not service related.  In Gosa, 
an Air Force airman third class was convicted of rape in a court-martial 
for an act that took place while he was off duty, off base, and out of 
uniform.332  He was convicted prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
O’Callahan,333 and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the 
decision in O’Callahan, seeking the benefit of the new rule.334  The 
Supreme Court ruled against Gosa, holding “that O’Callahan [would] be 
accorded prospective application only.”335  Justice Douglas concurred in 
part, noting that “petitioner was not tried by a kangaroo court or by eager 
vigilantes but by military authorities within the framework established 
by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”336   
Finally, in an appeal from an unfavorable decision by a Merit 
Systems Protection Board Administrative Law Judge, a former 
employee of the Defense Logistics Agency who had claimed racial 
discrimination challenged various discovery rulings by “mak[ing] 
conclusory allegations that the presiding official enacted a ‘ploy of 
orchestrating and presiding over a kangaroo hearing.’”337 However, the 
plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify any information that he was unable to 
obtain that would have affected the outcome of the proceedings . . . [and 
failed to] offer any reason that [his discovery] requests should have been 
granted,”338 thus causing Magistrate Judge Katz to conclude that “[t]here 
 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 554. 
 328. Id. (citing United States v. Bertelson, 3 M.J. 314 (C.M.A. 1977)). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 665 (1973). 
 331. O’Callahan v Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 
U.S. 435 (1987). 
 332. Gosa, 413 U.S. at 669. 
 333. Id. at 669-70. 
 334. Id. at 670. 
 335. Id. at 685. 
 336. Id. at 689-90 (Douglas, J., concurring in part). 
 337. Williams v. McCausland, No. 90 CIV. 7563(RWS)(THK), 1995 WL 548862, at *1, *19 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1995). 
 338. Id. at *19. 
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is nothing to suggest that the ALJ abused her discretion as to 
discovery.”339 
C.  Off to the Side 
In at least three cases, courts have ruled that collateral proceedings 
of one sort or another were conducted in a matter that warranted 
rejection of the losing litigant’s accusation of kangaroo-ism.  In one of 
those cases, Judge Young of the New York Court of Claims was faced 
with a civil action brought by an arrestee who claimed he had been 
assaulted by the police officer who arrested him.340  The defendant 
police officer won dismissal of the case, in part because “[t]he claimant 
[had] allowed his conviction for criminal assault [of the arresting 
officer], entered upon his own plea of guilt, to stand without attack direct 
or collateral [which] belie[d] his present assertion that his conviction 
occurred in a ‘kangaroo court’ as it belie[d] his present posture of 
innocence.”341   
In the second case, Wiggins v. State,342 Alphonso Wiggins 
petitioned to have several criminal convictions expunged from his 
record.343  Wiggins had been tried as an adult, and convicted, for six 
burglaries he committed just before and just after his sixteenth 
birthday.344  Arguing for the expungement of his record, he relied upon, 
and sought retroactive application of, Long v. Robinson,345 which 
declared unconstitutional a Maryland statute under which sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds were to be tried as juveniles except in Baltimore 
City, where they were to be tried as adults.  In ruling that the decision in 
Long was not subject to retroactive application, the court stated:  
 
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Gosa, Wiggins ‘was not tried by 
a kangaroo court or by eager vigilantes,’ but by a regularly constituted 
court of this State of the highest trial jurisdiction according to the 
regular criminal procedure with the right of trial by jury and the 
assistance of counsel.346   
 
 
 339. Id. 
 340. Phillips v. State, 222 N.Y.S.2d 633, 633 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1961). 
 341. Id. at 634. 
 342. Wiggins v. State, 344 A.2d 80 (Md. 1975). 
 343. Id. at 82. 
 344. Id. at 81. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 81, 95. 
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The third case, Moore v. Wainwright,347 was a habeas corpus 
proceeding in which Herman Roy Moore claimed that he had been 
subjected to “a ‘Kangaroo Parole Revocation Hearing’ by the Florida 
Parole and Probation Board.”348  The court disagreed, explaining “that 
the statute (Section 947.23, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.), allowing a parolee 
to have the representation of counsel at a hearing on revocation of 
parole, was permissive and that due process did not require that an 
indigent parolee be provided with counsel.”349 
D.  Behind Bars 
Inmate-run kangaroo courts are largely a thing of the past,350 but 
that does not mean that penal institutions are free from the spectre of 
kangaroo-ism; in several cases, prison inmates have claimed – 
unsuccessfully – that they had been taken before prison disciplinary 
boards that were nothing more than kangaroo courts. 
In Brown v. Bowles,351 Magistrate Judge Boyle dismissed the claim 
of an inmate in the Dallas (Texas) County Jail system, arising from 
alleged due process violations committed by “a ‘kangaroo court’ [that] 
penalized him with ten days in solitary confinement without 
privileges.”352  The magistrate judge based her ruling on the grounds that 
ten days in solitary confinement did not constitute an “atypical and 
significant hardship on the [plaintiff] in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life.”353  It would seem that behind bars, a tribunal has to jump 
just a little bit higher to earn the dishonor of being called a kangaroo 
court.354 
In Gilligan v. County of Sonoma,355 a case brought by an inmate in 
the Sonoma County (California) Main Adult Detention Facility, the 
plaintiff asserted “that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses 
 
 347. Moore v. Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
 348. Id. at 736. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See generally Potter, supra note 8. 
 351. Brown v. Bowles, No. 3:99-CV-2158-BC, 2000 WL 980011 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2000). 
 352. Id. at *4. 
 353. Id. 
 354. See, e.g., Lester v. Owens, No. Civ. A. 85-5695, 1985 WL 25970, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 
1985) (rejecting prisoner’s claim that disciplinary hearing was a “kangaroo-court” and noting that 
“[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of 
rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply”) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 556 (1974)). 
 355. Gilligan v. County of Sonoma, No. C 00-1706 CRB, 2001 WL 1352895 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
22, 2001). 
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during a disciplinary hearing,”356 which resulted in a violation of his due 
process rights.357  However, “Gilligan admittedly signed the hearing 
notice but did not identify witness[es] on the bottom portion because he 
‘thought it was a kangaroo court.’”358  Reasoning that Gilligan could not 
have been denied something he did not ask for, and that it was not even 
clear that Gilligan had a right to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing, 
Judge Breyer granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 
the due process claim.359   
Morgan v. Ward360 is another case in which an inmate declined, to 
his own detriment, to fully participate in a prison disciplinary 
proceeding: 
Morgan’s disciplinary record [from the Clinton County Correctional 
Facility in Dannemora, New York] reveals that between January 24, 
1975 and his transfer from Unit 14 in September 1975, he refused to 
leave his cell to attend Adjustment Committee Proceedings.  Morgan 
testified that he felt that the Adjustment Committee was a “kangaroo 
court” that perfunctorily credited false or trivial charges made by 
Clinton’s correctional officers.  There is no evidence that this opinion 
had a basis in fact.  Although the Adjustment Committee Proceedings 
failed to satisfy the Wolff requirements, they hardly constituted a 
mockery of justice. . . . To allow Morgan to challenge the charges after 
he unjustifiably refused to comply with established administrative 
procedures would undermine respect for all of the administrative 
mechanisms established by the State of New York for resolving 
disputes within its penal institutions. . . . Morgan’s failure to contest 
the charges made against him through the Adjustment Committee 
Proceedings provided precludes him from challenging in federal court 
the factual basis of those charges. . . .361 
The clear lesson of Gilligan and Morgan is that a charge of kangaroo-
ism is a dish best served after the fact.  Such charges should also be 
garnished with adequate factual support.362 
In a uniquely pled action, Billy J. Brooks, an inmate at the 
Stateville (Illinois) Correctional Center, sued the warden of the prison 
 
 356. Id. at *1, *3. 
 357. Id. at *9. 
 358. Id. at *3. 
 359. Id. at *9. 
 360. Morgan v. Ward, 699 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 361. Id. at 1044-45. 
 362. See Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526, 529 (W.D. Va. 1974) (dismissing prison 
inmate’s “broad and conclusory allegation[]” that “Unit Adjustment Committee is a ‘Kangaroo 
Court’” because allegation was “devoid of factual support”). 
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for cruel and unusual punishment based upon the warden’s alleged 
deliberate indifference to the actions of the prison’s Adjustment 
Committee, which, in Brooks’s view, was a “‘kangaroo court’ that 
wrongly and intentionally convicted him of an assault.”363  In affirming 
the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, after the jury had awarded a plaintiff’s verdict, the court 
of appeals first explained that “Brooks did not plead or prove the kind of 
‘punishment’ recognized under the Eighth Amendment,”364 and then 
went on to rule that “even if the bringing of false charges did constitute a 
kind of ‘punishment’ cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, Brooks’ 
claim would fail because he has not presented sufficient evidence on a 
necessary element of such a claim: the issue of [Warden] O’Leary’s 
mental state.”365  In the Eighth Amendment context, at least, it is not 
enough to jump like a kangaroo, but an adjudicator must also think like a 
kangaroo before his or her tribunal can correctly be called a kangaroo 
court. 
E.  At the Police Officer Station366 
Perhaps not coincidentally, police department disciplinary boards 
are nearly as popular as prison disciplinary boards as targets for 
accusations of kangaroo-ism. In Kearney v. Town of Wareham,367 a 
former member of the Wareham (Massachusetts) Police Department 
challenged his termination and intimated that his termination hearing 
was a kangaroo court,368 but “fail[ed] to support his invective with an 
evidentiary predicate.”369  As Judge Selya went on to explain,  
 
[r]hetoric alone will not suffice to prevent summary judgment, and, 
here, the facts are arrayed against Kearney.  After all, he was 
represented by counsel at the hearing, and the ground rules ensured him 
ample opportunity both to introduce evidence and to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses.  Equally as important, he has adduced no proof of 
bias or partiality on the part of the independent hearing officer.370 
 
 363. Brooks v. O’Leary, 33 F.3d 56 (unpublished table decision), No. 93-3559, 1994 WL 
468903, at **1 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 1994). 
 364. Id. at **2. 
 365. Id. 
 366. With apologies to Arlo Guthrie, and to those readers unfamiliar with Alice’s Restaurant, 
for whom the phrase “police officer station” is merely an ungrammatical redundancy. 
 367. Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 368. Id. at 23. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
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In Kerr v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass’n,371 a state trooper 
who had been terminated by the Pennsylvania State Police contended 
that the grievance arbitration procedure that resulted in his termination 
was “a sham, nothing more than a kangaroo court without adequate 
notice of the severity of the discipline and of appellate rights, and 
without adequate legal counsel.”372  Judge Troutman disagreed, ruling 
that the availability of a post-deprivation remedy under state law 
defeated Kerr’s due process claim.373  The judge also rejected Kerr’s due 
process claims on the merits, explaining that: (1) the Pennsylvania State 
Police had no duty to “guide plaintiff through the adversarial process 
and inform the plaintiff, a state trooper, of his right to appeal,”374 (2) 
adequate notice was provided to Kerr by a form that stated, directly 
above the plaintiff’s signature: “I UNDERSTAND NO MATTER 
WHICH PROCEDURE I SELECT, I AM SUBJECT TO 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION UP TO AND INCLUDING DISMISSAL, 
TRANSFER AND REDUCTION IN RANK;”375 and (3) the plaintiff’s 
collective bargaining unit, the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, 
was not a state actor and, consequently, not subject to liability under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.376 
In Anderson v. Dolce,377 a police officer facing termination from 
the White Plains (New York) Police Department challenged the 
constitutionality of Section 75 of New York’s civil service law, which 
“sets out the procedures for removal and other disciplinary action against 
tenured civil service employees of New York State and its political 
subdivisions.”378  Specifically: 
 
Officer Anderson charge[d] in his complaint that Section 75 is 
unconstitutional on its face because it allows the disciplinary authority, 
here Commissioner Dolce, to prefer the charges, select the prosecuting 
attorney, select the hearing officer if one is to be used, and render the 
final determination regardless of a hearing officer’s recommendation.  
This procedure allegedly violates due process which, according to the 
 
 371. Kerr v. Pa. State Troopers Ass’n, Civ. A. No. 93-4816, 1994 WL 585935 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
13, 1994). 
 372. Id. at *1,*4. 
 373. Id. at *4. 
 374. Id. at *5. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Anderson v. Dolce, 653 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 378. Id. at 1557. 
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complaint, requires that the adjudicative party be independent of the 
investigative and charging party. 
 
On his motion for summary judgment, Officer Anderson argue[d] that 
the overlapping of functions provided for in Section 75 poses a high 
risk that a disciplinary proceeding, whether conducted by the 
disciplinary authority personally or by a designated hearing officer, will 
be adjudicated by a biased and partisan tribunal and thereby rendered 
meaningless – a sham conducted by a “kangaroo court.”  The complaint 
faults the disciplinary authority’s absolute right to credit all testimony 
given against the employee and to discredit all favorable testimony 
based on findings of credibility.  By vesting such discretion in the 
disciplinary authority, Section 75 purportedly does little to protect the 
public employee who does not get along with his superiors but 
otherwise adequately performs his job.  In other words, Officer 
Anderson is arguing that Section 75 is inadequate to eradicate every 
last vestige of the old spoils system of the nineteenth century because 
the statutory scheme lends itself to manipulation and evasion by the 
disciplinary authority.379 
 
In response, the court stated that “[i]t is not clear that the statutory 
scheme, as currently construed by the state courts, vests as much power 
in the disciplinary authority as Officer Anderson claims,”380 and went on 
to rule that Section 75, in combination with Article 78 review, provided 
Officer Anderson with all the process he was due under Cleveland 
Board of Education v. Loudermill,381 and that the charges against Officer 
Anderson were heard by an unbiased tribunal.382 
In Clisham v. Board of Commissioners,383 a former police chief 
challenged his termination by the Naugatuck (Connecticut) Board of 
Police Commissioners on grounds that two members of the board were 
biased against him.384  After acknowledging that “[i]f it appears from the 
record that an administrative hearing was essentially a kangaroo court, 
the result of that hearing must be set aside,”385 and identifying a 
“‘determined purpose to reach a predetermined end’”386 as a form of 
 
 379. Id. at 1564. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 1567 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)). 
 382. Id. at 1570. 
 383. Clisham v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of the Borough of Naugatuck, No. 090211, 1991 WL 
158159 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 613 A.2d 254 (Conn. 1992). 
 384. Id. at *3. 
 385. Id. at *7. 
 386. Id. 
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kangaroo-ism, Judge Blue ruled in favor of the Board of Police 
Commissioners: 
Reviewing the record with this standard in mind, the Court is unable to 
conclude that the record establishes a personal bias sufficiently great to 
require the result of the hearing to be set aside.  The hearing . . . lasted 
over a year, and Clisham’s procedural due process rights were 
meticulously observed. With respect to Mason [one of the two 
Commissioners Clisham accused of bias], it must be observed that he 
took an active part in the February 14, 1989, deliberations and found 
five of the six charges pending against Clisham to be not proven.  On 
each of the three charges involving the Gene’s Cafe incident, Mason 
was in a minority voting for Clisham; on written charge 1, claiming that 
Chisham had threatened Malec, Mason was the only member voting for 
an acquittal.  This is not the sort of behavior that one expects from a 
member of a kangaroo court.  387 
Harris v. City of Russell,388 brought by a former officer of the Russell 
(Kansas) Police Department, involved yet another futile due process 
claim made by a terminated police officer: 
In his statement of facts, Harris includes a single comment by Sheriff 
Balloun condemning the hearing as a “kangaroo court.”  The reasons 
for this conclusory statement are unclear.  Moreover . . . Harris was 
provided with a lengthy post-termination hearing, which he attended 
with his lawyer.  He was permitted to present his side of the story, and 
to cross-examine adverse witnesses.  The hearing was attended by an 
independent advisory panel which unanimously recommended his 
termination.389 
Similar vindication was given to the Trial Board convened by the Coral 
Gables (Florida) Police Department to consider charges against Officer 
Lawrence A. Carastro: 
To begin with, Plaintiff received detailed notice of the charges. . . .  
Plaintiff was afforded an extensive evidentiary hearing . . .  The 
procedures were fairly conducted inasmuch as rules of evidence were 
substantially adhered to.  Witnesses were subpoenaed and ten 
witnesses testified before the Trial Board. Plaintiff was represented by 
counsel throughout the hearing, and counsel even conducted discovery 
of witnesses in advance of the hearing. Plaintiff had the opportunity to 
 
 387. Id. 
 388. Harris v. City of Russell, No. 93-1071-PFK, 1994 WL 240759, *1 (D. Kan. May 13, 
1994). 
 389. Id. at *10. 
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be heard and to present his defense although he himself chose not to 
testify on advice of counsel.  Finally, the neutrality of the Trial Board 
panel cannot be questioned. . . . The Court finds, therefore, that the 
proceedings of the Trial Board were more than adequate in the context 
of an administrative hearing and were not in any way a “Kangaroo 
Court.”390 
Taken together, Harris and Carestro provide a nearly foolproof recipe 
for Teflon disciplinary proceedings, adjudications so fair that no charge 
of kangaroo-ism could ever stick to them. 
F.  In Labor 
Along with the various police and prison disciplinary boards that 
have been cleared of charges of kangaroo-ism, there are a handful of 
labor unions. 
In Jones v. Iron Workers District Council Pension Trust,391 Judge 
Barker rejected the claim of a union member who argued that his 
challenge to the termination of his pension benefits by the Iron Workers 
District Council of Southern Ohio & Vicinity Pension Trust had been 
adjudicated by a kangaroo court, explaining that “Jones was represented 
by counsel before the appeals board, had numerous opportunities to 
explain what he did at KBE [the company where he was alleged to have 
engaged in disqualifying employment], and submitted to the appeals 
board several exhibits for consideration.”392  In Daniels v. National 
Alliance of Postal & Federal Employees,393 Judge Green made short 
work of claims of kangaroo-ism lodged by three plaintiffs who had been 
suspended from the union: “[P]laintiff Daniels testified that the 
procedure [used by the union to suspend him] resembled a ‘kangaroo 
court,’ and that he ‘never got a chance to be heard.’  The evidence 
presented at trial and at length below suggests precisely the opposite.”394  
Specifically, Judge Green found that all three plaintiffs were notified of 
the charges against them, replied to those charges, and were notified of 
the date, time, and location of their hearings.395  And in Burke v. 
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, 
 
 390. Carastro v. Gainer, 434 F. Supp. 296, 300 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
 391. Jones v. Iron Workers Dist. Council of S. Ohio, 829 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Ind. 1993). 
 392. Id. at 272, 273. 
 393. Daniels v. Nat’l Alliance of Postal and Fed. Employees, Civ.A. No. 83-1444, 1985 WL 
6408 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 1985). 
 394. Id. at *7. 
 395. Id. at *7-*8. 
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Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers,396 Judge Zirpoli ruled that the 
plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing before a Trial Panel convened by the 
union “was not shown to be a sham or kangaroo court,”397 despite the 
plaintiff’s claims of bias in favor of his accuser, who was an influential 
union official.398  In Judge Zirpoli’s view, the bias claim was refuted by 
“the record of the Trial Panel’s proceedings [which] show[ed] that the 
Panel ruled against Precht [the plaintiff’s accuser] on several occasions 
and afforded Burke every opportunity to present his case.”399 
Mayle v. Laborer’s International Union of North America, Local 
1015400 involved a union member’s claim that he had been wrongfully 
suspended from the union.  Judge Bell did not agree that the plaintiff’s 
suspension was improperly imposed: 
[P]laintiff . . . was given written notice of the charges and evidence 
was presented which he could, but did not, address. . . . The trial board 
members have all submitted affidavits saying that they did not 
prejudge plaintiff’s guilt.  While they admitted knowing some of the 
facts underlying the charges and reading the newspaper accounts, that 
is hardly surprising and not, in itself, the equivalent of prejudgment. 
Plaintiff’s depositional testimony shows that he decided that the 
hearing was a “kangaroo court,” he decided not to respond to questions 
and he decided not to present witnesses.  He thus cannot complain 
about the decision to expel him which was based on the evidence 
which was presented.401 
Just like prisoners facing disciplinary hearings, union members would be 
well advised to drop the K-bomb after being kangarooed, rather than 
prejudging the character of a proceeding yet to take place and losing the 
chance to complain about it afterward. 
In Toussaint v. Hall,402 Local 100 of the Transport Workers Union 
of America and a number of its members sued the national organization, 
and a number of its members, for misuse of union funds.403  Specifically, 
the plaintiffs claimed that various defendants, including Local 100’s 
former vice-president, Eddie Melendez, had used the Local’s American 
 
 396. Burke v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, 
302 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
 397. Id. at 1353. 
 398. Id. at 1352. 
 399. Id. at 1353. 
 400. Mayle v. Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am., Local 1015, 678 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ohio 
1987). 
 401. Id. at 697. 
 402. Toussaint v. Hall, No. 02 Civ. 6403(PKC), 2004 WL 1770062 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2004). 
 403. Id. at *1. 
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Express cards to charge goods and services for personal use.404  After a 
disciplinary proceeding held by the Local’s Trial Committee found 
Melendez liable for approximately $6,000 in credit card charges,405 
Melendez “claim[ed] at his deposition that the hearing he was afforded 
was not fair and was conducted before a ‘kangaroo court.’”406 Without 
analyzing the procedures used by the Trial Committee, Judge Castel 
nevertheless rejected Melendez’s claim of kangaroo-ism as both 
factually unsupported and illogical.407 
G.  Up and Down the Halls of Government 
Courts, of course, are not the only government entities that perform 
an adjudacatory function, and a wide variety of government agencies 
have been absolved of charges of kangaroo-ism. 
In Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County,408 the plaintiff 
applied “for a declaratory judgment holding that Chapter 162, Florida 
Statutes, violates Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution by 
establishing a ‘rogue’ judicial system”409 in the form of the code 
enforcement board.410  The court was “not unsympathetic to Jones’ 
argument (based on newspaper accounts and Jones’ description of 
hearings before other boards, which Jones cites in this case) that some 
boards take unbridled and arbitrary actions, and may well deserve Jones’ 
characterization of them as ‘kangaroo courts,’”411 but declined to grant 
Jones the judgment he sought, ruling that “[t]he powers given by the 
Legislature to code enforcement boards by Chapter 162 do not appear to 
 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at *2. 
 406. Id. at *3.  Melendez made that claim despite conceding that he had been afforded various 
rights under section 411 of the union’s constitution, including “service of the written charges against 
him,” id., and “a reasonable time to prepare his defense.” Id. 
 407. Id. at *4.  “Indeed, the conclusory claim that he did not appear because the Trial 
Committee was a ‘kangaroo court’ is inconsistent with his position that he did not appear before the 
Trial Committee or appeal its decision because he was no longer a member of the union.” Id.  Judge 
Castel further explored the illogic of Melendez’s position: 
While Melendez calls the Trial Committee a “kangaroo court” comprised of individuals 
who sought to discredit him, he never challenged a single individual who sat on the Trial 
Committee even though he was aware of his right to challenge these individuals.  
Melendez[’s] conclusory statement that he was denied his due process rights, without 
specific facts or affidavits to support this contention, cannot withstand plaintiffs’ motion 
[for summary judgment]. 
Id. 
 408. Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 409. Id. at 96. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
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us as having crossed the line between ‘quasi-judicial’ and ‘judicial.’”412  
Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United States413 involved “another variation on 
the theme of a rich but impecunious government contractor who has 
realized and should refund excess profits, at least according to orders of 
the Renegotiation Board, but who cannot stay enforcement of the orders 
because of inability to obtain a bond.”414  Regarding the work of the 
Renegotiation Board, the Court of Claims stated it “read the Board’s 
opinions attached to the petition, and [saw] that they are at least facially 
reasonable, not bearing the indicia of bias and prejudice, nor appearing 
the work product of a kangaroo court.”415 
In Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,416 the plaintiffs 
challenged a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
that placed restrictions on discharges related to a flood control project.417  
Among other things, the “[p]laintiffs argued that there was some foul 
play at the public hearings [held by EPA] because ‘individuals present at 
[them] were met by a hastily assembled “board” of “kangaroo court” 
ecological activists pre-set in their determinations of the issues to be 
aired publicly that evening.’”418 Judge Mitchell disagreed, noting that the 
hearing was “conducted . . . in an orderly and expeditious manner,”419 
which was all that was required.420  In another case involving 
environmental issues, the United States Forest Service achieved one-
third of a full vindication in the form of Judge Barrett’s dissenting 
opinion in Jette v. Bergland.421  In that case, which involved the Forest 
Service’s granting a permit to Exxon to search for copper in New 
Mexico’s Gila Forest,422 the court of appeals remanded to the district 
court for a determination of whether the Forest Service correctly 
determined that an Environmental Impact Statement was not 
necessary.423  In his dissent, Judge Barrett stated his belief that the 
district court had already implicitly decided the issue that was being 
 
 412. Id. 
 413. Solitron Devices, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 417 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
 414. Id. at 418. 
 415. Id. at 424. 
 416. Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, CIV. A. No. 77-25, 1988 WL 70103 (E.D. La. 
June 29, 1988). 
 417. Id. at *1. 
 418. Id. at *10. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Jette v. Bergland,  579 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1978), overruled by Vill. of Los Ranchos De 
Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 422. Id. at 60. 
 423. Id. at 65. 
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remanded,424 and also took a swipe at the plaintiff: 
Jette has been vocal in his insistence that the Forest Service, which he 
chose to unjustifiably accuse of conducting a “Kangaroo Court 
System” which “reaches its zenith in Fascist state but, unfortunately, is 
emulated by the Federal Bureaucracy,” is arbitrary and uncaring.  This 
is nonsense.  Jette intentionally by-passed administrative remedies 
which were proper and meaningful.425 
Timmons v. Division of Military & Naval Affairs426 involved claims 
of racial discrimination brought by an employee who was disciplined 
and ultimately discharged by the New York State Division of Military 
and Naval Affairs (“DMNA”).427  “In an unsigned statement, plaintiff 
claim[ed] that his numerous conflicts with his employer were part of a 
‘pattern [in] the way DMNA treat[ed] Black people,’ and that the 
disciplinary proceedings for African-Americans were unfair ‘kangaroo 
courts.’”428  Based upon an analysis of both statistical evidence and 
evidence concerning the disciplinary actions taken against the plaintiff, 
the court found nary a trace of kangaroo-ism.429 
Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs430 involved a claim by 
the former Tribal Chairman of the Crow Tribal Council that he had been 
removed from office in a manner that “violated the due process clause of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act”431 because, among other things, the 
impeachment procedures deprived him of his “right to be free of the 
‘Kangaroo-Court’ atmosphere within which the proceedings 
transpired.”432  At the Tribal Council meeting that resulted in a vote to 
impeach Stands Over Bull, proponents of impeachment were allowed to 
speak, followed by opponents.433  The plaintiff made such a statement: 
As for my defense, I will not make any comments.  Because I don’t 
realize this kind of kangaroo hearing, null and void.  I hereby as 
Chairman of the Crow Tribe declare it null and void.  My answers will 
come in proper authorities.  That’s all I have to say.  I will continue to 
 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. (emphasis in the original).  
 426. Timmons v. Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, No. 92 Civ. 0237 (MBM), 1994 WL 38861 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1994). 
 427. Id. at *1. 
 428. Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
 429. Id. at *5-*6. 
 430. Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mont. 1977). 
 431. Id. at 365. 
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. at 370. 
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act as your Chairman, if I am impeached I will still continue until I go 
through the proper channel.  I believe we are not done yet, (have them 
vote).”434 
While Stands Over Bull considered the Tribal Council to be operating as 
a kangaroo court, Judge Batten disagreed: 
The plaintiff’s refusal to present his case to the tribal council, and his 
election to disregard the proceedings as being those of a kangaroo 
court, are a manifestation of a vague familiarity with some precepts of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence and a disregard for the culture and 
tradition of the Crow Tribe.  In this case, although there were no 
formal invitations and even though non-tribal members were not 
permitted to speak, notice was properly given of the quarterly meeting 
and the agenda for that meeting.435 
Because Stands Over Bull received “the even-handed application of 
tribal customs, traditions and any formalized rules relative to the 
impeachment process itself,”436 Judge Batten “refuse[d] to hold that the 
manner in which Patrick Stands Over Bull was removed from office 
[was] so lacking in fundamental fairness as to constitute a denial of due 
process.”437  In other words, Stands Over Bull was not faced with the 
indignity of standing before a kangaroo at the Crow Tribal Council. 
H.  In Sickness and in Healthcare 
While the case that set my kangaroo court research in motion 
involved a hospital committee that was called a kangaroo court by 
Justice Levinson of the Hawai’i Supreme Court, several tribunals from 
the world of medicine have been given a clean bill of health following 
accusations of kangaroo-ism. 
 Leonard v. Board of Directors, Prowers County Hospital District438 
involved a physician’s challenge to the termination of his staff privileges 
at the Prowers Medical Center.439 
In January of 1980, four of the five hospital board members voted to 
renew plaintiff’s medial staff membership for the calendar year 1980.  
About one month later, the board requested plaintiff to remain after a 
 
 434. Id. at 371. 
 435. Id. at 376. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 376-77. 
 438. Leonard v. Bd. of Dirs., Prowers County Hosp. Dist., 673 P.2d 1019 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 439. Id. at 1021. 
67
Potter: Kangaroo Courts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
POTTER1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:16:14 AM 
140 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:73 
regular meeting to discuss with them a certain medical procedure 
involving possible malpractice performed by plaintiff on February 12, 
1980.  Plaintiff refused. 
After having received several letters from the hospital board and its 
attorney requesting more open communications, plaintiff wrote the 
hospital board a letter characterizing the board’s request for 
information as a “kangaroo court proceeding.”  In addition, plaintiff 
sent a written memorandum to the board’s attorney advising him to 
contact plaintiff’s attorney if he wished any further information.  This 
memorandum depicted a set of lips on the posterior of a nude figure.  
The letter and memorandum described were the key events which led 
the board, following its 1980 renewal of plaintiff’s staff membership, 
to change its position and commence proceedings against plaintiff to 
terminate his staff privileges.440 
While the trial court had no occasion to rule on the propriety of the 
particular act that the plaintiff labeled kangaroo-ish, the Colorado Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s 
privileges were revoked in strict accordance with the procedures 
outlined in the Powers County Hospital District Bylaws.441  The court 
went on to reject the plaintiff’s claim “that the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that neither the hospital board nor its hearing 
committee was disqualified by reason of bias and prejudice,”442 ruling 
that “[b]ecause only the defendant hospital board has the statutory power 
to revoke hospital privileges, the policy favoring an unprejudiced 
tribunal must yield, under the so-called ‘rule of necessity’ to allow 
action by the only body empowered to act in the matter.”443   
 Smith v. Ricks444 is another case arising out of the revocation of 
staff privileges.445  Specifically, John Smith asserted that Good 
Samaritan Hospital of the Santa Clara Valley in California violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act446 and the Clayton Act447 when it revoked his 
staff privileges.448  The defendants moved for summary judgment on 
grounds that they were immune from federal antitrust liability under the 
 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 1022. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Smith v. Ricks, 798 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 445. Id. at 606. 
 446. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. 
 447. 15 U.S.C. § 17. 
 448. Smith, 798 F. Supp. at 606. 
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Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.449  Regarding the 
plaintiff’s charge of kangaroo-ism, Judge Ware had this to say: 
The Court finds, in reviewing Plaintiff’s submissions, that Plaintiff’s 
broadly based allegations of conspiracy and flagrant violations of due 
process rights are largely unsubstantiated.  Plaintiff makes claims as to 
the current state of the law, the technical competence of other 
physicians at Good Samaritan Hospital, and broad accusations of the 
Good Samaritan review proceedings being akin to a “kangaroo court.”  
What Plaintiff fails to do, however, is explain in detail how and when 
any of these allegations truly occurred, and why they are relevant to 
the question of whether the Defendants’ review action warrants 
immunity. The Court is not required to conduct discovery for the 
Plaintiff in order to take the unsubstantiated allegations within 
Plaintiff’s papers and match them up with facts that tend to support 
these theories and claims.450 
Lack of specificity, it seems, is often the Achilles heel of a litigant’s 
accusation of kangaroo-ism. 
In Maxey v. United States,451 a physician sued his former employer 
and, among other things, “suggest[ed] that the decision of the Veterans 
Administration (VA) to terminate him was improperly made and 
implemented, then followed by ‘kangaroo court’ procedures to provide 
some ‘semblance of propriety.’”452 In rejecting the plaintiff’s charge of 
kangaroo-ism, Judge Waters characterized the procedure employed by 
the Fayetteville, Arkansas VA facility as follows: 
The procedure employed by the VA was fair.  It provided the plaintiff 
full, timely, and explicit notice of the basis for the disciplinary hearing, 
the possible results of such a hearing, and the procedures to be utilized.  
Plaintiff was allowed representation and an opportunity to submit 
anything he chose for consideration by the review board.  Plaintiff was 
given ample opportunity to cease the conduct of which the VA 
complained prior to the convening of the review board.453 
In Waltz v. Herlihy,454 a physician claimed that his due process rights 
were violated by the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners when it 
suspended his license to practice medicine.455   
 
 449. Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq. 
 450. Smith, 798 F. Supp. at 611-12 (citations omitted).  
 451. Maxey v. United States, Civ. No. 88-5034, 1989 WL 56497 (W.D. Ark. May 12, 1989). 
 452. Id. at *1. 
 453. Id. at *5. 
 454. Waltz v. Herlihy, 682 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ala. 1988). 
 455. Id. at 503.  Specifically, the plaintiff was found to have violated provisions of the 
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[Plaintiff] contend[ed] that the November 25, 1987 hearing [of the 
Board of Medical Examiners] was conducted by “a Kangaroo Court” 
made up of “Board hireling[s]” and that he [was] entitled under the 
Constitution to select the forum in which the [Alabama Medical 
Licensure] Commission’s complaint could be adjudicated, including a 
federal district court.456   
Regarding the plaintiff’s charge of kangaroo-ism, Judge Hand noted: 
“Plaintiff also contends that his post-deprivation hearing was 
meaningless because it was conducted by a ‘Kangaroo Court,’ a term not 
specifically defined by the plaintiff.  It would appear that plaintiff 
intended to [impugn] the impartiality of the decisionmakers.”457  Judge 
Hand rejected the plaintiff’s argument, observing that the plaintiff 
presented no facts to support a claim that the Alabama Medical 
Licensure Commission “impermissibly functions in both an 
investigatory and an adjudicatory role,”458 and ruling that even accepting 
the plaintiff’s claim that the Commission did perform those two 
functions, that alone would be insufficient to impugn its fairness.459 
Rust v. Missouri Dental Board460 was an appeal from a decision of 
the Circuit Court of St. Louis City to revoke A.J. Rust’s license to 
practice dentistry, a decision that followed “a like order made by the 
Missouri Dental Board after a hearing.”461  Dr. Rust’s license was 
revoked because he advertised his practice in violation of state law.462  
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision as 
follows: 
 
Sometime . . . before the trial, appellant had a pamphlet printed and 
circulated in St. Louis and vicinity.  At the head appeared his name, 
 
Alabama Code calling for the suspension and/or revocation of the medical licenses of physicians 
found guilty of: 
(8) Distribution by prescribing, dispensing, furnishing, or supplying of controlled 
substances to any person or patient for any reason other than a legitimate medical 
purpose;  
. . .   
(19) Being unable to practice medicine . . . with reasonable skill and safety to patients by 
reason of illness, inebriation, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, alcohol, chemicals or any 
other substance, or as a result of any mental or physical condition. 
Id. at 506 n.5. 
 456. Id. at 506 n.6. 
 457. Id. at 508. 
 458. Id. at 509. 
 459. Waltz, 682 F. Supp. at 509-10. 
 460. Rust v. Mo. Dental Bd., 155 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1941). 
 461. Id. at 82. 
 462. Id. 
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“Dr. A.J. Rust, Dentist,” and his two office addresses.  It was addressed 
“To the People of Missouri,” and was a diatribe on the prevailing high 
charges in dentistry.  It challenged “Missouri’s Dental Organization.”  
On the witness stand he characterized the Dental Board as a kangaroo 
court, and said there was more mechanical skill than medical skill in 
dentistry; and that he thought dentists should be allowed to advertise. 
He was against the law [banning advertizing by dentists].  Dr. Rust’s 
professional history and all this recalcitrance were competent evidence 
on the question of whether revocation of his license was cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
 
We think the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.  It is so 
ordered.463 
 
Plainly, with his challenge to the Missouri Dental Board, Dr. Rust bit off 
more than he could chew. 
 
I.  At the Schoolhouse 
 In a case that links the previous section to this one, Robert Hall 
challenged his dismissal from the Medical College of Ohio at Toledo 
(“MCO”), for academic dishonesty, claiming racial discrimination and 
violation of his constitutional right to due process.464  The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court’s rejection of Hall’s due process 
challenge: 
We also find baseless Hall’s vague accusations that the entire hearing 
process had been somehow contrived, as a “kangaroo court,” to drive 
him from medical school after he refused to withdraw voluntarily and 
seek psychiatric counselling.  Hall received adequate notice of the 
charges, and was permitted to offer evidence in his own behalf.  The 
hearing record contained evidence supporting the panel’s conclusion.  
Thus, we cannot conclude that any other “clearly established” 
constitutional rights were violated in Hall’s expulsion from MCO.465 
 
 463.   Id. at 89. 
      464.  See Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984). 
      465. Id. at 310.  The process by which Hall was disciplined was discussed in even greater 
detail in the preceding paragraph of the court’s opinion: 
Turning to Hall’s other allegations of due process violations, we find that he was given 
timely notice of both of the charges against him, . . .  Hall was further afforded the 
opportunity to testify on his own behalf, to present his own witnesses, and to cross-
examine those witnesses presented by Associate Dean Gerber (including his principal 
accusers).  He was given a copy of the hearing panel’s report, and of the decisions of 
Dean Kempf and President Ruppert adopting its recommendations.  A formal transcript 
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The balance of this section is devoted to other equally unavailing 
charges of schoolhouse kangaroo-ism. 
In Due v. Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University,466 Judge 
Carswell held that the disciplinary hearings that resulted in the indefinite 
suspension of two students “were not precipitously convened 
‘Kangaroo’ courts stripping one of a fair and reasonable chance to give 
account of his version of the case.”467  In Curry v. Pulliam,468 Judge 
Barker held that Robert Fields, President of the Greater Clark County 
(Indiana) Board of School Trustees, did not subject custodian Maurice 
Curry to a kangaroo court disciplinary hearing, because Curry “merely 
assert[ed] that the decision to terminate him was made before the 
hearing”469 but did not “offer evidence from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could infer such a conclusion.”470 
Finally, in Breitling v. Solenberger,471 a teacher who was dismissed 
by the Frederick County (Virginia) school system sued five members of 
the county school board who had voted for his dismissal.472  In his suit, 
he asserted “that he was denied due process of law under the fourteenth 
amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the School Board’s use of their 
retained counsel, Mr. William Johnson, in the capacity both as 
representative of the prosecuting agency and as the representative of the 
adjudicatory body.”473  In an order granting summary judgment to the 
school board members, Judge Michael stated: 
Acceptance of the plaintiff’s contention would require that either the 
superintendent would have to present his case for dismissal without 
legal assistance or that the School Board must retain additional counsel 
 
of the hearing was prepared and (presumably) available to Hall, and he was able to point 
out what he perceived to be the deficiencies in the hearing and the panel’s decision 
during his meeting with the college president.  Aside from the question of counsel, it is 
hard to see what further procedural safeguards could have been provided without turning 
this hearing process into an exact equivalent of a courtroom trial – something that no 
court has yet required. 
Id. at 309-10.  A more detailed prescription for how to avoid kangaroo-ism – and charges of 
kangaroo-ism – can hardly be imagined. 
 466. Due v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). 
 467. Id. at 403.  Judge Carswell’s reasoning is discussed in greater detail in section II.A.3, 
supra.  The students were suspended because they had been convicted for contempt of court, which, 
according to the student handbook, was an offense that could be punished by suspension from the 
university.  Id. at 399. 
 468. Curry v. Pulliam, 234 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 469. Id. at 928. 
 470. Id. at 928-29. 
 471. Breitling v. Solenberger, 585 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Va. 1984). 
 472. Id. at 290. 
 473. Id. 
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for the superintendent alone in the context of such an administrative 
hearing. 
The plaintiff bases his argument, novel to this court, on the case of 
Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).  In a 
footnote, the court makes a passing critical reference in this public 
employee dismissal case to the employer’s use of the same counsel 
both to represent the prosecuting agency and the adjudicatory body.  
Id. at 522 n.14.  The plaintiff admits that the factual setting of Ciechon 
is far different from his; the Ciechon court refers to the dismissed 
employee’s hearing as a “kangaroo court” replete with egregious due 
process violations. Certainly, this mere dictum constitutes weak 
support for the plaintiff’s proposition, given the general rule that no 
“Chinese wall” must be erected between prosecutory and adjudicatory 
functions in an administrative setting such as the one here. 
J.  Affirming with Faint Praise 
Of course, when one is accused of kangaroo-ism, the sweetest 
vindication is hearing a judge say (or write) that it just ain’t so.  
Sometimes, however, vindication comes in half measures, based upon a 
procedural rather than a substantive victory.  Litigant accusations of 
kangaroo-ism have been defeated, deflected, or deferred by all manner 
of procedural mechanisms, including forfeiture,474 waiver,475 failure to 
adequately allege facts supporting a charge of kangaroo-ism,476 lack of 
 
 474. Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabot, 335 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2003).  In the words of Judge 
Lynch: 
Plaintiff protests in her brief to us that these determinations, made during the disciplinary 
process [instituted by the Puerto Rico Justice Department’s Special Investigations 
Bureau], were factually incorrect in various ways.  We assume that it would be probative 
for plaintiff if she could show she was subjected to a biased kangaroo court in the 
disciplinary process.  But her objections come too late. . . .  [S]he failed to contest these 
facts before the district court within the deadlines established by the local rules, and to 
provide evidence – not just assertions – that the process had been biased and flawed.   
Id. 
 475. Holt Hauling & Warehousing Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, No. 
Civ.A. 93-7059, 1995 WL 540524, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1995) (holding that plaintiff’s 
previous agreement to participate in arbitration procedure with Local 1332 of the International 
Longshoreman’s Association trumped its argument that likely result of arbitration was a kangaroo 
court).  See also Burton v. Dickson, 180 P. 216, 218 (Kan. 1919) (expelled member of the Kansas 
State Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry gave up right to challenge, in court, various procedures at 
her expulsion hearing by “refus[ing] to be tried by a ‘kangaroo court’” and, thus, “refus[ing] to have 
anything to do with the . . . proceedings”). 
 476. Anderson v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 521 F.2d 420, 421 (8th Cir. 1975).  See also SEC v. 
Profit Enters, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2020, 1992 WL 420904, at *6-*7 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 1992) 
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jurisdiction,477 Rooker-Feldman abstention,478 collateral estoppel,479 the 
rule that a convicted criminal defendant cannot re-litigate the question of 
his guilt in a civil rights action,480 ripeness,481 failure to comply with the 
 
(rejecting as “partially unintelligible” defendants’ claim that plaintiff’s “fictitious facts make 
[defendants] out to be like Jesse James and Bonnie and Clyde all wrapped into one” and that 
plaintiff had “designed and engineered” a “kangaroo hearing”); Smith v. Hilltown Twp., Civ. A. 
No. 88-2615, 1988 WL 115769, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1988). 
 477. In re Rauch, 390 F.2d 760, 761 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (explaining that the court had no 
authority to review decisions of the Commissioner of Patents concerning Patent Office’s alleged 
denial of the opportunity to amend patent claims); Trauss v. City of Philadelphia, 159 F. Supp. 672, 
674 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (declining to entertain plaintiffs’ “plethoric assertions as to discrimination, 
conspiracy and overreaching” of Board of Labor Standards due to plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust state 
remedies); Crooks v. Dist. Council 37, Local 1549, 390 F. Supp. 354, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(dismissing complaint of racial discrimination against employer and labor union, for want of 
jurisdiction, due to plaintiff’s failure to bring suit with ninety days of EEOC’s decision to dismiss 
her charge, thus absolving Personnel Review Board of New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation of plaintiff’s claim that hearing that resulted in her discharge “was no more than a 
‘Kangaroo Court’”). 
 478. McManama v. Clackamas County, No. CV-00-1387-ST, 2001 WL 34047022 (D. Or. June 
13, 2001).  In the words of Magistrate Judge Stewart: 
The essence of the first of these claims is that McManama considers the [Oregon] state 
court system incompetent by alleging that the underlying proceedings consisted of a 
“kangaroo trial” in front of a “kangaroo court” (Complaint, pp. 6-7), and believes that he 
can only be vindicated by filing a claim in federal court. This claim is clearly barred by 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in that it amounts to an improper attempt to have this 
Court review an adverse state court judgment. 
Id. at *4 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). 
 479. Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a 
discharged New York City Police Department employee was not permitted to pursue claim that 
termination hearing was kangaroo court because he had opportunity to litigate fairness of hearing 
during Article 78 proceeding). 
 480. Felders v. Miller, 776 F. Supp. 424, 430 (N.D. Ind. 1991).  As Chief Judge Sharp 
explained things: 
Apparently, the plaintiff’s charge as to a so-called kangaroo court relating to the conduct 
of the [Lake County, Indiana] prosecutor, T. Edward Page, and a commissioner in regard 
to proceedings on December 5, and 7, 1984, in 4CR-227-11284-885, represents an 
attempt to re-litigate the issue of this plaintiff’s guilt.  King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885 
(7th Cir. 1990), simply does not authorize that enterprise.  This plaintiff may, if he hasn’t 
already, raise issues under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but this is not such a case.  This case is 
under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Id. 
 481. Villani v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on 
reargument, 367 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) .  In Villani, Judge Lasker stated: 
While it is true that appeals are to be heard by the Board of Directors (or a delegated 
committee of the Board) who are presently suing the plaintiffs here, and that, therefore, 
the question of fairness is more acutely presented than in the case of the hearing 
procedure, we think that until the hearing stage is completed, it is too early to consider 
appellate questions. 
Although the plaintiffs assert that, at the hearing they will face a “kangaroo court”, we 
have indicated our doubts that this is so, and it is mere speculation to predict the outcome 
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local rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,482 the rule that 
“relief from alleged trial errors may not be obtained by habeas 
corpus,”483 and the fact that an alleged act of kangaroo-ism, setting aside 
a default judgment, was not an appealable decision.484  Perhaps the most 
striking example of this form of demi-vindication was penned by Justice 
Edwards of the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals: 
The evidence is weak, and the trial as exemplified by the record 
suggests a kangaroo proceeding.  However, no demurrer was filed to 
the information, nor objection to the introduction on the ground of 
insufficiency made, and no exception taken to any instruction. . . . The 
brief argues various questions not presented by the petition in error.  
. . . [T]he defects and errors are either waived, or not so fundamentally 
erroneous as to require a reversal.485 
If several of the cases in previous sections stand for the proposition that 
one must submit to the marsupial before asserting a credible claim of 
kangaroo-ism, Shestokas and the other cases in this section stand for an 
equally important proposition: one who has been kangarooed must say 
so, in the right way, before relief can be granted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As advertised in the title, this article is a field guide to kangaroos in 
American courtrooms.  Thus, I conclude with several pointers regarding 
where to look for marsupial decision-makers and what to look for. 
As for where to look, there are two good choices: follow the joeys, 
or go to Chicago.  Institutionally speaking, juvenile courts have been the 
 
of the hearing.   
Id. at 1191-92. 
 482. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 372 F. Supp. 939, 952-53 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
 483. Commonwealth. ex rel. Baerchus v. Myers, 168 A.2d 754, 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) 
(declining to reach prisoner’s claim that “the trial judge [in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Lackawana County, Pennsylvania] was prejudiced, that sentences were imposed in chambers by ‘a 
kangaroo court’, that one of the jurors was a personal friend of the warden of the county jail, and 
that the conviction was obtained as a result of perjured testimony and on evidence that was 
generally insufficient”). 
 484. See Gosnell v. Gosnell, 329 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).  In Gosnell, the 
Springfield (Missouri) Court of Appeals did not reach a claim of kangaroo-ism asserted against the 
Pulaski County Circuit Court and noted not only that the alleged act of kangaroo-ism was the 
product of an unappealable judicial act, but also that the party complaining of kangaroo-ism 
appeared not to have challenged the trial court’s action at the time, raising questions of forfeit or 
waiver.  Id. at 233-34. 
 485. Shestokas v. State, 236 P. 629, 629 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925). 
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most frequent targets of judicial accusations of kangaroo-ism.  But of 
course, searching for kangaroos in juvenile courts would be an enormous 
undertaking, given the dispersion of juvenile courts across the entire 
country.  So, for those interested in a geographically limited kangaroo 
safari, it is difficult to imagine a more productive venue than that 
toddling town, the city of big shoulders, the hog butcher to the world, 
where kangaroo-ism has been detected in the personnel board and two 
different school boards.  If you’re interested in one-stop shopping for 
your next kangaroo, Chicago is the place to go. 
However, even with a prime spot staked out, it is important to bear 
in mind the characteristic behaviors of the kangaroo adjudicator.  So 
here, in ascending order of popularity (with all due respect to David 
Letterman and a tip of the metaphorical fedora to Quentin Tarantino), I 
present the top twelve decision-making behaviors that have inspired a 
judge to get marsupial on another tribunal’s ass: (12) depriving a person 
of property based upon false charges;486 (11) employing procedural rules 
that unfairly favor one side over the other;487 (10) conducting an 
inadequate investigation;488 (9) basing a decision on insufficient 
evidence;489 (8) denying an accused person the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses;490 (7) acting out of an improper motivation;491 (6) 
exhibiting bias;492 (5) denying an accused person the opportunity to 
confront his or her accusers;493 (4) delaying excessively the decision-
making process;494 (3) denying an accused person the opportunity to 
present witnesses;495 (2) denying an accused person access to counsel;496 
 
 486. Gierbolini Colon v. Aponte Roque, 666 F. Supp. 334, 338 (D.P.R. 1987); Cole v. Fair 
Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 745 (Cal. 1987) (en banc). 
 487. Smith v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 165 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999); Little 
Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D. Mont. 1988). 
 488. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 521 (7th Cir. 1982); Dorsey v. Kingsland, 173 
F.2d 405, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 489. Dorsey, 173 F.2d at 407; In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 399, 402 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 490. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 (1967); Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ind. 
1973). 
 491. Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 522; Cole, 729 P.2d at 745; City of Boston v. Mass. Comm’n 
Against Discrimination, 654 N.E.2d 944, 947 (Mass. Ct. App. 1995). 
 492. Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 521; Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 711 F. Supp. 394, 410 (N.D. Ill. 
1989); Little Horn State Bank, 690 F. Supp. at 921. 
 493. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42-57; King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1983); Brevetti v. 
Tzougros, 247 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). 
 494. Dorsey, 173 F.2d at 407; Little Horn State Bank, 690 F. Supp. at 921; Commonwealth. v. 
Sadler, 3 Phila. County Rptr. 316, 330 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979) (citation omitted). 
 495. King, 702 F.2d at 19; Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp 233, 237 (D. Minn. 1963); 
Humphrey v. Ne. Conn. Sportsman Ass’n, Inc., No. CV020087895S, 2002 WL 31045973, at *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2002); Robinson, 297 N.E.2d at 410. 
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and (1) providing an accused person with inadequate notice of the 
charges against him or her.497 
Having set out where to look for adjudicatory kangaroos, and what 
to look for, there is nothing left for me to do but say happy hunting, and 
g’day mates! 
 
 496. Gault, 387 U.S. at 34-42; King, 702 F.2d at 19; Nelson, 212 F. Supp. at 237; In re Billie, 
429 P.2d 699, 701 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), vacated, 436 P.2d 130 (Ariz. 1968); Robinson, 297 N.E.2d 
at 410; Humphrey, 2002 WL 31045972, at *4. 
 497. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-34; King, 702 F.2d at 19; Dorsey, 173 F.2d at 407; Little Horn State 
Bank, 690 F. Supp. at 921; Gierbolini Colon, 666 F. Supp. at 338; Brevetti, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97; 
Randolph v. Spruce Cabin Camping Ass’n, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 71, 73 (Ct. Com. Pl., Monroe County 
1979). 
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